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ESSAYS ON ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 
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approaches, including the rationing of water for particular users, installation of particular technologies, 
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2015 urban water conservation mandate was performed. Results indicate that the average welfare 
loss of the mandate is $6,107 per acre-foot of restriction in Northern California and $2,757 per acre-
foot of restriction in Southern California. In terms of monthly household-level willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) to avoid the mandate, results illustrate that households have a WTP between $5 and $200 per 
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targets, while Southern Californian utilities tended to fall short. The second essay focuses on 
analyzing how web-based Home Water Use Reports (HWURs) affect household-level water 
consumption in Folsom City, California. The HWURs under study, offered by the 
company Dropcountr (DC), share social comparisons, consumption analytics, and conservation 
information to residential accounts, primarily through digital communications. We found that there is 
a 7.8% reduction in average daily household water consumption for a typical household under 
treatment of the DC program. Results suggest that the effect of DC varies by the baseline 
consumption quintile, the number of months in the program, the day of the week, message type, and 
enrollment wave. Furthermore, we find that indicate these responses to DC program likely come 
from the information channel rather than moral suasion. The final essay studies the effectiveness of 
ISO-14001 on pollution reduction as a non-price pollution control approach. Manufacturers have 
been increasingly relying on environmental management systems (such as ISO 14001 based ones) to 
comply with government regulations and reduce waste. In this essay, we investigated the impact of 
ISO 14001 certification on manufacturers’ toxic release by release level. Results show that ISO 
14001 had a negative and statistically significant effect on the top 10% manufacturing sites regarding 
the on-site toxic release, but it did not reduce off-site toxic release. Therefore, one should not expect 
ISO 14001 to have a uniform impact on manufacturing sites’ environmental performance. For large 
firms, encouraging voluntary adoption of ISO 14001 might be an effective government strategy to 
reduce on-site pollution. 
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1  Background  
 
Policymakers have two broad types of instruments for meeting environmental goals. 
They can use non-price methods including regulatory—command and control-- and 
voluntary approaches, or they can use market-based approaches that rely on market 
forces. Despite the popularity of non-price approaches, empirical work is credibly 
identifying both the effectiveness and consequences of these policies as well as the 
heterogeneous effects of these policies among different groups remains in its infancy. My 
dissertation focuses on the development of empirical methods to investigate the non-price 
approaches in addressing environmental issues as well as exploring the heterogenous 
implications of these policies.  
These questions are important not only as a justification for using non-price 
approaches to achieve environmental goals and evaluating alternative options but also for 
understanding how heterogenous effects may shape the design and implementation of 
these policies. For example, a general problem with the regulatory approaches, such as 
urban water mandates, is that they are associated with consumer or producer welfare 
losses. It is important to assess these losses because it improves our understanding of the 
cost of these policies which is maybe to some policymakers is not so tangible. Also, 
estimating welfare cost of such policies is useful for evaluating alternative policy options 
including market-based approaches. A general problem with voluntary actions to reduce 
environmental externalities, such as reducing water consumption or pollution level, is 
that it is empirically difficult to assess the success of these programs. However, given the 
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number of voluntary approaches being implemented in the United States as a way to 
achieve the environmental goals, measuring the effectiveness of these programs has 
become increasingly important. My dissertation investigates these questions in the 
context of programs and policies that are important in their own right. Chapter 2 of my 
dissertation explores the welfare costs associated with the recent environmental 
regulatory program in the United States, California’s 2015 urban water mandate. 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the effectiveness of voluntary policies in the context of water 
conservation technology adoption and pollution reduction certification adoption. My 
dissertation remains unified in both its subject matter and methodological approach – 
using unique sources of data and sound research designs to understand important issues 
in environmental policy. 
Furthermore, both welfare losses of regulatory approaches and effectiveness of 
voluntary approaches are potentially different among different groups of consumers or 
producers, for example, depending on the income, consumption or production level, firm 
size or other demographics  Understanding heterogeneous effects of these policies will 
allow targeting groups that are most responsive, which will be a cost-effective strategy 
(Djebbari and Smith 2008, Ferraro and Miranda 2013, Heckman, Smith, and Clements 
1997). Also, investigating heterogeneous effects by subgroups helps researchers 
understand generalizability of the result to other populations and places (Ferraro and 
Miranda 2013, Imai and Ratkovic 2013, Manski 2004). In all three essays, I examine the 
heterogeneity of the results and evaluate the implications of these heterogeneities.  
1.2 Objectives and Structure 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of regulatory and 
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voluntary approaches as an environmental policy. The primary focuses are on 
understanding welfare effects of regulatory policies, the effectiveness of voluntary 
approaches and heterogeneity of these effects. To achieve these goals, we focus on three 
programs in the United States. First, we examine the recent regulatory policy that has 
been implemented in California. In April 2015, governor of California, Jerry Brown, 
issued an executive order mandating a statewide reduction in urban water use by 25% 
because of a multi-year drought. We estimate the welfare losses due to California’s 2015 
water conservation mandate as a regulatory approach. Second, we examine the 
effectiveness of a voluntary water consumption analytics program to reduce water 
consumption. Finally, we study the effectiveness of voluntary adoption of ISO-14001 
certification by manufacturing facilities on pollution reduction.  
In the second chapter, we measure the welfare consequences of the 2015 
California drought mandate. In response to the severe California drought, in April 2015 
Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order mandating a statewide reduction in 
water use. The mandate aims to reduce the amount of water consumed statewide in urban 
areas by 25% from 2013 levels. The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) 
proposed regulatory instructions that grouped urban water suppliers into nine tiers, with 
conservation standards ranging from 8% to 36%. In this chapter, we evaluate welfare 
losses due to this mandate. Understanding the proposed regulation’s welfare losses 
requires estimating water demand. Using a fixed effect model and data from 2004 to 
2009 on 111 urban water utilities an annual demand curve is estimated. The estimated 
demand elasticity is between -0.61 and -0.1 which is heterogeneous across the regions. In 
the second step, we use estimated annual demand function to recover price elasticities in 
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a sample of 53 urban water utilities in California which provide water for more than 20 
million customers. We calculate the average welfare loss of the mandate to be $6,107 per 
acre-foot of restriction in Northern California and $2,757 per acre-foot of restriction in 
Southern California. In terms of monthly household-level willingness-to-pay (WTP) to 
avoid the mandate, we find households have a WTP between $5 and $200 per month. 
Northern Californian utilities were generally in compliance with their mandated 
conservation targets, while Southern Californian utilities tended to fall short. In addition, 
using data on changes in actual consumption during the drought we estimate welfare 
losses under imperfect compliance with the mandate. 
 The second essay (chapter three) focuses on understanding heterogeneous effects of 
consumption analytics on residential water consumption. This essay estimates how 
web-based Home Water Use Reports (HWURs) affect household-level water 
consumption in Folsom City, California. The HWURs under study, offered by the 
company Dropcountr (DC), share social comparisons, consumption analytics, and 
conservation information to residential accounts, primarily through digital 
communications. The data utilized in this essay is a daily panel tracking single-family 
residential households from January-2013 to May-2017. We found that there is a 7.8% 
reduction in average daily household water consumption for a typical household who 
enrolled in DC program. Results suggest that the effect of DC varies by the baseline 
consumption quintile, the number of months in the program, the day of the week, 
quartile of the year, message type, and enrollment wave. We also conduct empirical 
tests to evaluate the channels through which DC may act to reduce consumption. 
Results indicate these responses to DC program likely come from the information 
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channel rather than moral suasion. Furthermore, our results indicate that providing 
consumption and pricing information may not improve the effectiveness of non-linear 
pricing. 
 Chapter 4 details the third essay, with a focus on voluntary action to reduce 
pollution. In this essay, we evaluate the effect of the ISO-14001 standard on firms’ 
environmental performance. Manufacturers have been increasingly relying on 
environmental management systems (such as ISO 14001 based ones) to comply with 
government regulations and reduce waste. In this essay, we investigated the impact of 
ISO 14001 certification as a voluntary approach to manufacturers’ toxic release by 
release level. Our theoretical model suggests that ISO 14001 effect on pollution is 
mixed depending on the initial pollution levels. In the empirical section of this essay, 
we applied the censored quantile instrumental variable estimator (CQIV) to data on the 
U.S. transportation equipment manufacturing subsector facilities. Results show that ISO 
14001 had a negative and statistically significant effect on the top 10% manufacturing 
sites regarding the on-site toxic release, but it did not reduce off-site toxic release. 
Therefore, one should not expect ISO 14001 to have a uniform impact on 
manufacturing sites’ environmental performance. For large firms, encouraging 
voluntary adoption of ISO 14001 might be an effective government strategy to reduce 
on-site pollution. However, for small firms and to reduce off-site pollution, other 
economic incentives or regulations are warranted. 
 From a broader perspective, these papers shed light on the non-price approaches as 
an environmental policy. We examine welfare consequences and effectiveness of 
regulatory and voluntary approaches and how these effects could be heterogeneous 
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among different subgroups. Chapter 5 summarizes the collective findings and provides 
some discussion of potential implications. 
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Chapter 2. WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF CALIFORNIA’S 2015 DROUGHT 
WATER CONSERVATION MANDATE 
Abstract 
In April 2015, California Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order mandating a 
statewide reduction in water use by 25% in urban areas because of a multi-year drought. 
We estimate the mandate’s effect on consumer welfare losses using a novel panel dataset 
of price and monthly water consumption data on 111 water utilities to estimate utility-
specific demand curves. We calculate the average welfare loss of the mandate to be 
$6,107 per acre-foot of restriction in Northern California and $2,757 per acre-foot of 
restriction in Southern California. Regarding monthly household-level willingness-to-
pay (WTP) to avoid the mandate, we find households have a WTP between $5 and $200 
per month. Northern Californian utilities were generally in compliance with their 
mandated conservation targets, while Southern Californian utilities tended to fall short. 
Also, using data on changes in actual consumption during the drought we estimate 
welfare losses under imperfect compliance with the mandate. 
 
Keywords: California, demand, government policy, urban water utilities, water supply 
restriction 
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2.1 Introduction 
The recent California drought, which began with an abnormally dry period in late 2011 
and was declared over in April 2017, was one of the most extreme on record, 
characterized by low precipitation and high temperatures (Shukla et al. 2015). The 
drought impacted local communities, ecosystems, and the economy in a multitude of 
ways; for instance, during this period there was a rapid drawdown of groundwater 
reserves (Famiglietti 2014, Harter and Dahlke 2014) and an increase in agricultural land 
fallowing (Howitt et al. 2014). In response to these drought conditions, in April 2015, 
Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order mandating a 25% reduction in urban 
water use effective between June 2015 and February 2016. This reduction was projected 
to save approximately 1.3 million acre-feet of water over the 9-month period.  
The California State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB), the state agency 
responsible for the implementation of the order, initially proposed a relatively uniform set 
of restrictions across water utilities. The final regulation, however, departed from that 
approach, setting the highest percentage reductions on those utilities with the highest 
water use regarding gallons per capita per day (GPCD). Under the SWRCB’s adopted 
regulation, only urban water utilities serving more than 3,000 customers or delivering 
more than 3,000 acre-feet (AF) of water per year were required to reduce their customers’ 
water consumption, with restrictions ranging from 4% to 36% of baseline usage (the 
adopted schedule defines nine conservation standards based on the per capita water usage 
during 2014 summer months; see Table 2-1 for the schedule). According to the SWRCB, 
the 411 urban water utilities subject to this mandate provide more than 90% of urban 
water supplies in California.1 In this paper, we quantify the welfare consequences of 
                                                     
1 A large number of very small suppliers serving less than 3,000 customers exist in California.  
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these restrictions for residential consumers in Northern and Southern California.2 We 
compare our predicted welfare losses, which assume perfect implementation of the 
restrictions, to estimates of actual welfare losses based on realized reductions in 
consumption. 
Restricting urban water use is a common drought management strategy in many 
parts of the United States. Most urban water restrictions focus on the single-family 
residential sector (Mansur and Olmstead 2012) because it is generally considered to have 
lower value use than the multi-family residential, commercial, and industrial sectors. 
Moreover, reducing residential consumption is generally expected to result in fewer job 
losses and output effects than restricting commercial and industrial water use. In 
California, the residential sector accounts for one-half to two-thirds of urban water use in 
a typical community. Thus, the largest costs of restrictions are consumer welfare losses 
resulting from reduced water consumption. As demonstrated by Buck et al. (2016), 
because water rates are often more than marginal supply costs, the consumer welfare 
loss from mandatory conservation can be significantly higher than the loss evaluated 
using standard consumer surplus measures of welfare. 
Our preferred estimates suggest that the predicted consumer welfare losses 
experienced as a consequence of utility-specific water restrictions were approximately 
$875 million across the utilities in our sample. Not surprisingly, predicted welfare losses 
under a uniform restriction of 25% across all utilities are larger—welfare losses under 
such a scenario are estimated to be under $1.20 billion. While the bulk of the welfare 
                                                     
2 Urban locations in Northern California include the City and County of San Francisco and their wholesale 
customers. Urban locations in Southern California include those serviced by the Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California—these are the greater Los Angeles and San Diego regions. 
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losses were experienced in Southern California where the population is larger, per-
household losses are larger in Northern California. Average welfare losses in Southern 
California are approximately $2,800 per acre-foot of reduced consumption, while they 
are $6,100 per acre-foot in Northern California. Our estimates suggest that the household 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) to avoid the 2015 mandatory restrictions is $26 per month in 
Southern California and $24 per month in Northern California under typical 
consumption levels.  
Water utilities do not have complete control over their customers, so it is not 
surprising that actual changes in consumption did not perfectly match the mandated 
reductions for each utility. We also calculate welfare losses under actual changes in 
consumption. The welfare results for observed changes in consumption differ somewhat 
from those which assumed reductions in consumption equal to mandated levels. In 
general, consumers in Northern California met or exceeded their conservation targets, 
while consumers in Southern California often fell short. 
2.2 Welfare Loss Framework 
We determine welfare losses in the residential sector using a measure of consumers’ 
WTP to avoid water supply restriction, which is similar to other recent works (Brozović, 
Sunding, and Zilberman 2007, Buck et al. 2016). Notably, among water utilities in 
California, and the United States more broadly, volumetric water rates reflect both 
variable and fixed costs. Often the fixed cost component of price is considerable; thus, 
the consumer surplus triangle can underestimate losses experienced by consumers. Buck 
et al. (2016) provide evidence of average cost pricing among public water utilities in 
California. Consistent with this, we measure welfare losses as the area under the demand 
11 
 
curve and above the marginal costs curve. We assume a constant elasticity of demand and 
estimate the single-family residential water demand elasticities for each urban water 
utility using the functional form: 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖𝑄𝑖
1
𝜀𝑖   (𝑖 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑛)   (1) 
where, 𝐴𝑖  is a constant and 𝑖 is the elasticity of water demand in utility i. We denote 
price and quantity of water consumption by households in urban water utility service area 
i prior to the mandatory supply restriction as 𝑃𝑖
∗ and 𝑄𝑖
∗, respectively.  
Let 𝑄𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡) indicate available water supply for urban water utility i under a 
restriction for utility i at time t; assume 𝑄𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡) < 𝑄𝑖
∗. We define available supply under a 
restriction as:  
𝑄𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡) = (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡)𝑄𝑖
∗      (2) 
Using equations (1) and (2), we can estimate consumers’ willingness-to-pay to 
avoid a supply restriction 𝑟𝑖𝑡 by integrating under the isoelastic demand curve between 
baseline consumption 𝑄𝑖
∗ and consumption under the restriction, 𝑄𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡). This is 
demonstrated with the equalities below: 
𝑊𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡) = ∫ 𝑃𝑖(𝑄)𝑑𝑄
𝑄𝑖
∗
𝑄𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡)
= ∫ 𝐴𝑖𝑄𝑖
1
𝜀𝑖𝑑𝑄
𝑄𝑖
∗
𝑄𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡)
=
𝑖
1 + 𝑖
𝑃𝑖
∗𝑄𝑖
∗ [1 − (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
1+𝜀𝑖
𝜀𝑖 ]  (3) 
 
Note that an urban water utility’s total cost of service is the sum of fixed cost 
(e.g., infrastructure costs, repair, and maintenance, administrative expenses, etc.) and 
variable cost (e.g., energy and chemical costs of treating water), with the latter depending 
on the amount of water delivered to customers. Supply restrictions reduce variable costs 
simply because the urban water utility i supplies less water, recall that 𝑄𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡) < 𝑄𝑖
∗. The 
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measure of WTP to avoid a restriction – indicated in equation (3) – does not account for 
the avoided costs of service delivery when there is a supply restriction; therefore, 
equation (3) is not a correct measure of welfare losses. 
Assuming the marginal cost of service delivery is 𝐶𝑖 , equation (3) becomes as 
follows: 
𝑊𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡) =
𝑖
1 + 𝑖
𝑃𝑖
∗𝑄𝑖
∗ [1 − (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
1+𝜀𝑖
𝜀𝑖 ]  − ∫ 𝐶𝑖(𝑥)𝑑𝑥
𝑄𝑖
∗
𝑄𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡)
 (4) 
Assuming a flat marginal cost curve, we can re-write the welfare loss function as 
follows: 
𝑊𝑖(𝑟𝑖𝑡) =
𝑖
1 + 𝑖
𝑃𝑖
∗𝑄𝑖
∗ [1 − (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
1+𝜀𝑖
𝜀𝑖 ]  − 𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑄𝑖
∗𝐶𝑖 (5) 
Under the assumption of a flat marginal cost curve, the average loss per unit of 
restriction is: 
𝑊𝑖/𝑄𝑖
∗𝑟𝑖𝑡 =
𝑖
1 + 𝑖
𝑃𝑖
∗ [1 − (1 − 𝑟𝑖𝑡)
1+𝜀𝑖
𝜀𝑖 ] /𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖 (6) 
 
Based on equation (6), the average welfare loss resulting from a supply restriction 
is a function of the elasticity of demand in service area i, the initial water price before the 
supply restriction in water utility i at time t, and the variable cost of service in water 
utility i. 
2.3 Residential Water Demand Estimation 
Accurate price elasticity of water demand is essential for measuring consumer welfare 
losses associated with California’s 2015 restrictions. Arbués, Garcıa-Valiñas, and 
Martınez-Espiñeira (2003) overview methodologies for estimation of water demand by 
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analyzing different specifications of water demand models, functional forms, different 
data sets, selection of variables, and type of price specification. Additional examples of 
water demand estimation and associated issues are described in several works in the 
United States (Gaudin 2006, Hewitt and Hanemann 1995, Olmstead, Hanemann, and 
Stavins 2007, Pint 1999, Renwick and Green 2000) and around the world (e.g., in France, 
Nauges and Thomas (2003); in Germany, Schleich and Hillenbrand (2009); in Italy, 
Mazzanti and Montini (2006); in Spain, Martinez-Espineira (2007)). We use these studies 
to frame our empirical demand model regarding specification, functional form, and 
choice of control variables. 
Water consumption is measured as the average household consumption for each 
utility and month in the dataset. In terms of functional form, the log-log model is used, 
where all continuous variables enter into the regression equation in logarithmic form. 
This functional form has frequently been used in previous studies (Frondel and Messner 
2008, Mazzanti and Montini 2006, Olmstead, Hanemann, and Stavins 2007). An 
attractive feature of this form is that the coefficient on price can be interpreted as the 
price elasticity of demand. 
One potential issue is whether the estimator for this coefficient suffers from 
simultaneity bias. Consistent with other similar settings (Buck et al. 2016, Olmstead and 
Stavins 2009), water rates are set by local government, rather than the market supply and 
demand equilibrium; this should break possible simultaneity bias. Despite this, the cross-
sectional analysis is still vulnerable to omitted variable bias, which can arise from a 
variety of unobserved factors (Billings and Agthe 1980, Gaudin 2006, Martínez-Espiñeira 
2002). To address bias resulting from omitted time-invariant demand factors, utility fixed 
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effects are included in the preferred demand specification. 
2.3.1 Econometric specification & data 
We use a fixed effects estimator with utility and year fixed effects. The base equation we 
estimate is reported in equation (7): 
ln(𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑡) = 𝛽1 ln(𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡) + 𝛽2 ln(𝑊𝑖𝑚𝑡) + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑚𝑡 (7) 
where 𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑡  is the average single family residential consumption in utility service area i in 
month m and year t; 𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑡 is the marginal price per hundred cubic foot (CCF) on the 
median tier of the price schedule; 𝑊𝑖𝑚𝑡 is a vector of precipitation and temperature 
measures; 𝜇𝑖 is a utility service area fixed effect; 𝜃𝑡 is a year fixed effect; and 𝑢𝑖𝑚𝑡 
captures all unobserved factors affecting the dependent variable. Spatial heterogeneity is 
modeled by interacting price with median household income and a region indicator 
variable; see Reiss and White (2005) for a commonly cited example of this interaction. 
The residential demand estimation uses utility-level panel data on average 
monthly water consumption and annual price, between January 2004 and December 
2009, for single-family residential consumers in California. One of the advantages of 
using monthly data is that we can tailor our analysis to the mandate period (June 2015 –
February-2016). Thus, we estimate the elasticity of water demand using the relevant 
period and drop observations from March, April, and May 2015. The dataset includes 90 
urban water utilities in the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) 
and 21 utilities in the San Francisco Bay Area. Consumption and price data for water 
utilities in the San Francisco Bay Area were obtained from the Bay Area & Water Supply 
Conservation Agency Annual Surveys from 2004-2009; similar data for water utilities in 
the MWD service area were obtained by directly contacting each water utility. 
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We measure utility-level average monthly water consumption per household in 
hundreds of cubic feet (CCF). Table 2-2 provides descriptive statistics for water 
consumption by region and season in 2009. Water consumption in sample utilities located 
in Southern California is, on average, 1.6 times higher than water consumption in sample 
utilities located in Northern California. This pattern reflects somewhat lower densities 
and drier conditions in Southern California, which leads to more outdoor water use and 
higher overall consumption. Not surprisingly, there is an even larger gap in residential 
consumption between Southern and Northern California during the summer months, 
when landscape irrigation is more common. 
We use Census tract data from the year 2000 to obtain information on median 
household income and household size. The measure of lot size is derived from data 
collected by DataQuick. Utility-specific measures of these variables are generated using 
the intersection between utility-specific borders and Census tract borders. This allows us 
to generate a weighted-average of these variables that reflect the population of single-
family residential households for each specific utility. In addition, we include weather 
drivers of residential demand (precipitation and temperature), which are obtained from 
PRISM (Parameter-elevation Regressions on Independent Slopes Model) group data. 
2.3.2 Estimation results 
The results of the residential water demand estimation are presented in Table 2-3. 
Column (1) of Table 2-3 presents the baseline fixed effects model corresponding to 
Equation (7). The estimated price elasticity of demand is -0.198. In Column (2), we add 
weather variables (average daily maximum temperature and monthly precipitation) and 
month of year fixed effects to control for seasonality. Since neither the year-to-year 
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variation in weather nor the month of year fixed effects is correlated with price, we do 
not expect the point estimate to change much. Consistent with this, we obtain an 
estimated price elasticity of demand of -0.207. The primary objective of adding these 
additional controls is to explain variation in consumption, and by doing so, reduce the 
standard error for the coefficient on our price measure. Notably, the within R-squared 
increases from 0.021 to 0.543 and precision improves, though not by a significant degree 
(t-stat increases from 2.07 to 2.19). One concern with the specifications in the first two 
columns is that they are vulnerable to bias resulting from omitted time-variant variables 
related to both price and consumption. To address this concern, in Column (3) we 
estimate a model that includes county-specific linear and quadratic time trends. These 
variables control for time-variant county level unobservables that share a common trend 
within a county. An example is conservation efforts since water utilities in the same 
county generally share common conservation programs. Under this specification, we 
observe an estimated price elasticity of -0.23. 
To demonstrate the utility of using monthly, instead of annual water consumption 
data, Column (4) of Table 2-3 presents demand estimation results in which annual data 
has been used to estimate the price elasticity of demand. The elasticity point estimate 
using annual data is -0.184; we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the point estimates 
in Column (3) and Column (4) are identical. 
In the final specification presented in Table 2-3, we add interaction between price 
and income. This interaction term captures how price responses vary by household 
income level. Because the price elasticity of demand is negative, a positive coefficient on 
the interaction term indicates a decrease in the price response as income increases—
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thereby implying less elastic demand. Results for this specification are reported in 
Column (5) of Table 2-3 and indicate that the price elasticity of water demand in an urban 
water utility with a median household income of $65,000 would be -0.19. Moving 
forward, we use this specification to estimate elasticities for the welfare loss calculations. 
2.4 Welfare Analysis 
Welfare losses resulting from restrictions on residential water consumption in Northern 
and Southern California are quantified using equation (5) and consumption data from the 
year 2013 (the baseline period according to the SWRCB regulation) encompassing 53 
urban water utilities in California, including 27 utilities in the San Francisco Bay Area of 
Northern California and 26 utilities in the Los Angeles and San Diego regions of 
Southern California. The mandate affects the entire residential sector, both single and 
multi-family residential consumers. The econometric analysis in the preceding section 
focused on the single-family residential sector because comparable data is not available 
for the multi-family residential sector. Therefore, in the subsequent welfare analysis, we 
assume single and multi-family sectors have identical elasticities. This is a simplifying 
assumption which acts to under-estimate losses for at least two reasons. First, the multi-
family residential sector mainly consists of indoor water consumption, so these users 
have fewer margins on which to reduce water consumption compared to consumers in the 
single-family residential sector. This suggests more inelastic demand for the multi-family 
residential sector. Second, precisely because the two sectors’ demand curves are 
different, the efficient distribution of restrictions across the two sectors would not be 
proportional. Grouping them with an identical elasticity implicitly assumes proportional 
rationing across the single and multi-family residential demand sectors. In this case, 
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proportional rationing is inefficient because it does not account for the more elastic 
demand in the single-family residential sector. By combining these sectors, we are 
implicitly avoiding any incremental losses that would result from an inefficient allocation 
of restrictions between these different sectors. Therefore, these assumptions may result in 
reduced estimates for the consumer welfare consequences of the mandate. 
2.4.1 Data for calculation of welfare losses 
From equation (5), the calculation of welfare losses requires data on baseline price, 
baseline quantity demanded, the percentage of use restricted, the price elasticity of 
demand, and the marginal cost of service delivery.3 
We use consumption data from the year 2013 as our baseline, or pre-drought, 
quantity-demanded. Data were obtained from the SWRCB, which calculates an estimate 
of residential water consumption by month for approximately 400 water utilities in 
California. For the Northern California utilities that belong to Bay Area Water Supply & 
Conservation Agency (BAWSCA), the price data comes from median tier price reported 
in the BAWSCA survey for the year 2014. Prices for the other utilities were obtained 
from their website or through a telephone interview. In the case of wholesale utilities, 
including many of the utilities that belong to the MWD, no single median tier price exists 
because they sell their water to multiple local utilities that set their rates. Thus, for each 
wholesale utility, we collect rate information on every local utility within the wholesale 
utility and then generate a quantity-weighted average of the median tier price. Figure 2-1 
presents the range of median tier prices (converted to price per acre-foot of water) for 
                                                     
3 For the marginal cost of service delivery we use $193 per acre-foot based of previous 
work by Buck et al. (2016), which relies on financial documents from California utilities. 
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these 53 urban water utilities. The mean, minimum and maximum prices per acre-foot in 
Northern California are $2,513, $1,446, and $4,217, respectively. The mean, minimum 
and maximum prices per acre-foot in Southern California are $1,526, $674, and $2,943, 
respectively.  
The demand estimation result presented in Column (5) of Table 2-3 suggests that 
the price elasticity of water is significantly different across utilities throughout California, 
according to median household income levels. The distributions of elasticities implied 
from this result for the Northern and Southern California utilities of interest are displayed 
in Figure 2-2.4 Estimated mean, minimum and maximum price elasticities in Northern 
California utilities are -0.16, -0.32, and -0.1, respectively. Estimated mean, minimum and 
maximum price elasticities in Southern California utilities are -0.29, -0.50, and -0.1, 
respectively.5 This suggests that consumers in Southern California may be able to 
accommodate water restrictions than consumers in Northern California more easily. This 
is consistent with the pattern of cut-backs ultimately adopted by the SWRCB, in which 
Southern California faced more stringent requirements than Northern California. These 
primary observations suggest there are likely efficiency gains from the SWRCB 
conservation program relative to uniform restrictions across utilities. 
Welfare losses for two regulatory scenarios are estimated to examine whether there 
are welfare improvements from choosing the SWRCB restrictions instead of a uniform 
cut-back across utilities. In the first scenario, we assume a uniform percentage restriction 
(25%) relative to baseline consumption during the year 2013 (less consumption during 
                                                     
4 We construct measures of median household income for each of the 53 utilities based on data from the 
American Community Survey. 
5 For utilities with a GPCPD greater than 150. 
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March, April, and May, which are excluded under the SWRCB regulation). This scenario 
is representative of a naïve policy option in which policymakers do not differentiate 
requirements based on variation in the values for the marginal unit of water across 
utilities. For example, under this policy, utilities with high and low outdoor water 
consumption will face the same percentage cut-backs. In the second scenario, we assume 
utility-specific restrictions based on the SWRCB utility-level conservation standards 
(henceforth, this scenario is referenced as the SWRCB conservation program). Under the 
SWRCB conservation program, urban water utilities are assigned to reduce their total 
consumption from June 2015 through February 2016 at rates between 4% and 36% based 
on historical consumption levels. In the case of wholesale utilities, no single conservation 
standard exists because they sell their water to multiple local utilities, which have their 
conservation standard from SWRCB. Thus, for each wholesale utility, we collect 
conservation standard information on every local utility within the wholesale utility and 
use this information to calculate a household-weighted average conservation standard. 
Figure 2-3 shows the distribution of mandatory conservation percentages (i.e., 
restriction percentages) by region. Utilities in Northern California are mostly in tiers 2, 3, 
and 4 of the SWRCB conservation program with a weighted average restriction of 16.2%. 
Utilities in Southern California are in higher tiers (6, 7, 8, and 9) with a weighted average 
restriction of 22.5%. 
2.4.2 Estimated welfare losses forecasted under perfect compliance 
In Table 2-5 we present estimates of average forecasted welfare losses per acre-foot of 
restriction under perfect compliance with a uniform restriction (25%) and the SWRCB 
conservation program. The average welfare loss per acre-foot due to a uniform 25% 
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restriction is $5,094, which represents an aggregate loss for the metropolitan regions of 
Northern and Southern California of $1.20 billion. Under the SWRCB conservation 
program, the average welfare loss per acre-foot is $3,846, which represents an aggregate 
loss of $875 million. For these two metropolitan regions, we observe lower aggregate 
welfare losses under the SWRCB conservation program than under a uniform restriction 
policy. However, these figures are difficult to compare since, in consumption terms, the 
SWRCB conservation program is less than a 25% restriction, at least for those utilities in 
the study sample. This is because utilities outside of the metropolitan regions we 
considered were generally assigned percentage restrictions through the SWRCB 
conservation program that were greater than 25%. For the utilities included in our 
analysis, total water saved by single-family households, assuming perfect compliance, is 
373,000 acre-feet under the 25% uniform restriction, but only 336,000 acre-feet under the 
SWRCB conservation program. The aggregate percentage restriction from the SWRCB 
conservation program is just under 20% in the urban areas under study. 
Next, we assess efficiency advantages of these policies and evaluate important 
regional differences in the relative incidence of losses under each policy. Table 2-5 
presents the results of forecasted welfare loss calculations for Northern and Southern 
California under perfect compliance with a uniform 25% restriction and the SWRCB 
conservation program. In Northern California, forecasted welfare losses are estimated to 
be $182 million under a 25% uniform restriction and $106 million under the SWRCB 
conservation program. In Southern California, forecasted welfare losses are estimated to 
be $1.01 billion under a 25% uniform restriction and $769 million under the SWRCB 
conservation program. Larger total losses in Southern California relative to Northern 
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California are due to the larger population. In Northern California, a comparison of the 
uniform restriction (25%) and the SWRCB conservation program indicates average 
welfare losses per acre-foot of $6,726 and $6,107, respectively. In Southern California, 
average welfare loss per acre-foot of restriction is $2,832 under the 25% uniform 
restriction and $2,757 under the SWRCB conservation program.  
However, to effectively evaluate efficiency, we require a different comparison for 
Northern and Southern California since, under the SWRCB conservation program, 
Northern and Southern California would reduce residential urban consumption by less 
than 25%. To this end, Column (3) of Table 2-5 presents welfare analysis corresponding 
to a hypothetical uniform restriction policy that achieves the same level of cutbacks as the 
SWRCB conservation program for each of the regions: Northern California (16.2% 
overall restriction) and Southern California (22.5% overall restriction). In Northern 
California, the average welfare loss per-acre foot under a uniform restriction of 16.2% is 
$3,983. In Southern California, the average welfare loss per-acre foot under a uniform 
restriction of 22.5% is $2,654. In both cases, average losses are lower under the adjusted 
uniform restriction compared to the SWRCB conservation program. This finding is 
surprising because uniform restrictions on service areas with heterogeneous elasticities 
tend to be inefficient.  The utility-specific restrictions under the SWRCB conservation 
program were not assigned according to an efficient allocation scheme. 
Besides inefficiency, another argument against a uniform percentage restriction is 
inequity. Under the SWRCB program, restrictions are monotonically increasing 
according to baseline consumption, which works to tighten the distribution of household 
level consumption across service areas. Further, there is a strong positive relationship 
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between consumption in the residential sector and household income; thus, cut-backs are 
generally larger under the SWRCB conservation program for households in wealthier 
services areas (e.g., Hillsborough in Northern California and Beverly Hills in Southern 
California) than for households in poorer service areas. Therefore, by its very 
construction, the SWRCB program is more equitable than a uniform cut-back. 
The second and fourth rows of Table 2-5 indicate the 95% confidence interval for each 
estimate. These confidence intervals reflect the estimated variability in the price elasticities 
of demand recovered from the regression analysis. Due to the non-linearity of price 
elasticity in the expression of welfare losses, confidence intervals for welfare estimates are 
bootstrapped by cluster (urban water utility), they are not based on analytic standard errors. 
 Our data also provides some insight into the magnitude of estimated welfare 
effects in terms of implied household WTP measures. The fifth row of each panel 
illustrates the average household’s WTP under each scenario. Estimated monthly WTP 
per household to avoid the 25% restriction is $42 in Northern California and $34 in 
Southern California, while under the SWRCB conservation program, households 
estimated monthly WTP is $24 in Northern California and $26 in Southern California. 
Consistent with previous results, the higher WTP to avoid the uniform 25% cut-back 
demonstrates that households find the 25% uniform cut-back more harmful than the 
SWRCB conservation program. Again, this is driven by the fact that the SWRCB 
conservation program conserves less water in the urban areas included in this study. The 
third column displays the WTP to avoid a uniform policy achieving the same aggregate 
water reduction as the SWRCB conservation program. We observe that the average 
household WTP to avoid such a uniform percentage cut-back is less than the WTP to 
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avoid the SWRCB conservation program. Overall, these households’ WTP measures are 
not as large as some might fear, though they are sizeable when compared to baseline 
household water expenditures. 
The last row of both panels illustrates households’ WTP measure regarding the 
percentage increase in expenditures on the volumetric rate component of the households’ 
monthly water bills. Households in Northern California have a WTP in terms of increase 
in monthly water bills between 28% and 75%, depending on the scenario. Households in 
Southern California have a WTP regarding percentage increase in the monthly bills 
between 31% and 41%.  
Table 2-6’s presentation of average outcomes for large metropolitan areas masks the 
high degree of variation within the Northern and Southern California regions. Figure 2-4 
illustrates the heterogeneity in average welfare loss per acre-foot of restriction for urban 
water utilities within each region. We observe average welfare losses per acre-foot 
ranging from approximately $800 to $15,000. Relative to Southern California, the 
distribution in Northern California is shifted to the right and is more disperse. This figure 
reflects that households have more inelastic demand in the San Francisco Bay Area than 
in Southern California. Further, the wider range of average welfare losses per acre-foot of 
restriction in the San Francisco Bay Area reflects its greater variability in incomes, which 
coincides with household landscaping choices in the region. When comparing these 
distributions of average welfare losses for a uniform restriction versus utility-specific 
restrictions, we observe somewhat contrasting patterns in Northern versus Southern 
California. In Northern California, the distribution of average welfare losses for the 
uniform restriction is flatter than and shifted to the right of the distribution for the utility-
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specific restrictions, while in Southern California, the distribution for the uniform 
restriction has more mass to the left and a smaller right tail than the distribution for the 
utility-specific restrictions. The distributions of average welfare losses for both Northern 
and Southern California provide visual evidence that there is significant heterogeneity in 
welfare impacts across the state. 
Overall, the anticipated welfare losses under perfect compliance with the SWRCB 
conservation program suggest aggregate losses of $106 million for the 27 agencies we 
consider in Northern California and $769 million for the 26 agencies we consider in 
Southern California. 
2.4.3 Actual welfare losses under observed imperfect compliance 
We calculate actual welfare losses, based on imperfect compliance with the SWRCB 
conservation program since some utilities did not meet their conservation standard, while 
others exceeded them. Tables 2-6 and 2-7 present estimated average monthly R-GPCD6 
for both June-February 2013 and the mandate period (June 2015 to February 2016), by 
the utility. These tables also present both the mandated percentage cut-back and the 
observed percentage cut-back.7 The final two columns in the tables compare predicted 
average welfare losses under perfect compliance with the SWRCB conservation program 
and estimates of actual average welfare losses observed under imperfect compliance with 
the SWRCB conservation program. 
The numbers in the first two columns of both tables 2-6 and 2-7 confirm that average 
                                                     
6 R-GPCD= Residential Gallons per Capita Day. 
7 For more information visit: 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/water_issues/programs/conservation_portal/conservation
_reporting.shtml  
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consumption decreased in the mandate period for all of the utilities in Northern and 
Southern California, compared to the base year 2013. However, the magnitudes and 
spatial distribution of actual reductions are not consistent with the SWRCB conservation 
program. For example, the SWRCB conservation program imposed a 32% restriction on 
Beverly Hills, but they only achieved a 19% reduction in water consumption.  
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2-6 summarize the restrictions from the SWRCB 
conservation program, and the corresponding observed percentage reductions relative to 
2013, for utilities in Northern California. Recorded consumption for utilities in Northern 
California (with reported data) shows that 23 of 24 utilities considered actually exceeded 
the required consumption cut-backs. California Water Service-Bear Gulch is the only 
utility that did not to meet its cut-back standard, though the target was only missed by 
one percentage point. On average, utilities in Northern California reduced water usage by 
seven percentage points more than was required by the SWRCB conservation program. 
The same columns in Table 2-7 show these restrictions and observed percentage 
reductions for utilities in Southern California. Compared to the results from Northern 
California, only 8 of 25 utilities met their conservation standard, and 9 of the 17 utilities 
that missed their standards did so by more than 5 percentage points. Overall, Table 2-7 
demonstrates a mismatch in the spatial distribution of assigned versus observed cut-backs 
in Southern California.8 For example, while Beverly Hills missed their conservation 
target, San Diego exceeded their target of 16%, achieving a 19% reduction. On average, 
                                                     
8 In the case of wholesale utilities, such as many of the utilities belonging to MWD, no 
single observed reduction exists because they sell their water to multiple local utilities 
who have their own reductions. Thus, for each wholesale utility, we collected observed 
reduction information on every single local utility within the wholesale utility, and a 
household-weighted average reduction was calculated. 
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utilities in Southern California reduced their water usage by approximately three 
percentage points less than what was required by the SWRCB conservation program.  
The difference in compliance between Northern and Southern California is striking, 
though it is difficult to attribute to a single factor. A natural driver of compliance may be 
the value of restricted water units. For example, Beverly Hills’ anticipated average 
welfare loss per acre-foot due to their mandated 32% restriction would be over $11,000 
per acre-foot. Thus, their incentive to comply was considerably less than other utilities in 
Southern California (the majority of utilities had anticipated average welfare losses per 
acre-foot below $3,000). However, other utilities with anticipated average welfare losses 
above $11,000 per acre-foot managed to comply with the mandate. Another important 
feature of the SWRCB conservation program was that individual utilities were charged 
with determining how mandated conservation targets would be met. For instance, the 
City of Hillsborough, which had large anticipated average welfare losses, imposed 
stringent prohibitions on certain categories of water-use. Wichman (2016) showed that 
prohibitions on categories of water-use (e.g., landscape irrigation) result in larger 
reductions than other conservation strategies (e.g., conservation pricing), especially 
among high income, high volume users. Wichman’s results on conservation pricing are 
consistent with the residential [isoelastic] demand estimation presented in the previous 
section showing that high-income households are more inelastic. A general takeaway 
from Wichman, Taylor, and Von Haefen (2016) is that conservation response will depend 
on a utility’s conservation strategy; thus, differences in compliance may be attributed to 
each utility’s method for achieving the SWRCB conservation standards. While individual 
utilities under the SWRCB conservation plan are given flexibility regarding how to meet 
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assigned conservation standards, the SWRCB program also defined a $10,000 a day fine 
on water utilities for not meeting the assigned targets. Thus, income levels and the size of 
the customer base for a utility’s service area could also affect compliance, since high-
income communities with a sizable customer base may not be responsive to fines 
assessed at the utility level.  
Utility-level conservation encouragement may also explain the pattern of compliance 
across California, although encouragement could affect compliance through distinct 
channels. A common form of conservation encouragement is to offer rebates for water 
efficient appliances. At the state-level, the California Energy Commission has offered 
rebate programs to replace inefficient showerheads, faucet heads, older appliances with 
newer, water-efficient models, and water-intensive lawns with turf or brownscaping 
(SWRCB, 2015). In addition to state programs, many urban water utilities support 
participation in state-sponsored programs or augment the state programs with local rebate 
offers. Historical participation in rebate programs may lead to demand hardening; after 
initial conservation efforts, there may be few margins on which to further reduce 
consumption. This highlights the fact that the base year of 2013 that was used to 
determine utility-specific conservation standards is an arbitrary base period which 
penalized utilities that achieved significant conservation in the years immediately before 
2013 (or favored microclimatic regions that had an unseasonably dry, warm year in 
2013). For these reasons, historical conservation may partially explain compliance. 
Participation in rebate programming in response to the mandate, or in the years 
immediately preceding it (but after the base year of 2013), would support compliance 
with restrictions. For example, city utilities, such as Menlo Park in Northern California, 
29 
 
had attractive rebate programs during the mandate period for lawn replacement and 
offered a subsidized consultation on how to design drought-tolerant landscaping. 
Naturally, these types of recent conservation efforts at the utility level may also explain 
the pattern of compliance across utilities. 
A separate channel through which encouragement may explain compliance with the 
SWRCB conservation standards is moral suasion through conservation messaging and 
local social norms. Hollis (2016) documents how urban water consumption covaries over 
time during MWD’s multi-faceted conservation messaging program, which uses roadside 
billboards and freeway signs, radio messages, and TV advertisements. Other water 
conservation messaging includes a host of interviews, op-ed pieces, news stories and 
public service messages. In addition to the MWD, urban water utilities conducted their 
public information campaigns—8 of 10 Southern Californians reported having recently 
heard conservation-related messages (Hollis, 2016). Evidence on the effectiveness of 
such conservation messaging is mixed and may depend on factors such as local green-
ness. Therefore, differential responses to conservation messaging in Northern and 
Southern California may also explain the divergence in compliance with the SWRCB’s 
conservation program.  
Another potential determinant of compliance is water supply storage. In Southern 
California, utilities have made significant investments in storage. For example, when the 
mandated restrictions were announced in the year 2015, MWD had approximately one 
million acre-feet of dry-year storage, a significant amount to report after three years of 
intense drought. To put this in perspective, MWD generally provides less than two 
million acre-feet of water annually; thus, their dry-year reserves at the end of a three-year 
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drought were capable of servicing over half of their historical annual demand quantity. 
While protecting dry-year storage supplies is an important consideration, utilities in 
Southern California may have determined that they have sufficient storage to weather the 
drought without enforcing the SWRCB conservation program restrictions.  
While the pattern of compliance seems somewhat unexpected, one simple observation 
is worth pointing out.  The mandated restrictions in Northern California compared to 
Southern California were significantly less in both percentage terms (16.2% versus 
22.5% reduction) and absolute terms (12 R-GPCD versus 24 R-GPCD reductions). Given 
these facts alone, we might anticipate more compliance in Northern California, though 
there are likely other drivers.  
We conclude this section by presenting welfare loss results under observed imperfect 
compliance, as opposed to hypothetical perfect compliance, with mandated restrictions. 
In the Northern California region, estimates of average welfare losses per acre-foot from 
actual reductions over the course of the mandate range from $2,702 to $15,710. In the 
Southern California region, estimates of welfare losses from actual reductions range from 
$890 to $7,349. The difference between average welfare losses calculated from estimates 
of actual reductions in Northern and Southern California ($7,375 - $2,537 = $4,838) is 
considerably larger than the difference between the predicted average welfare losses 
calculated assuming perfect compliance ($4,717 - $2,974 = $1,743). This makes sense 
since utilities in Northern California, which have more inelastic demands than utilities in 
Southern California, tended to exceed their conservation standards, while those in 
Southern California tended to miss their standards. 
Putting these numbers in perspective, the per household, per month results suggest 
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that households in Northern California would have been willing to pay between $12 and 
$468 per month to avoid the conservation efforts that were actually implemented in 
response to the mandate; the median household would have been willing to pay $39 per 
month. In Southern California, the results suggest that households would have been 
willing to pay between $5 and $177 per month to avoid the conservation efforts they 
implemented in response to the mandate and the median household would have been 
willing to pay $26 per month. Residential water demand in Northern California tends to 
be more inelastic than in Southern California, resulting in higher welfare losses for a 
given percentage reduction in water use.  
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
Californians experienced a severe drought between late 2011 through early 2017, perhaps 
the worst in California’s history regarding its economic impacts on urban users. 
According to the U.S. Drought Monitor, more than 50% of the state was in an “extreme” 
drought event with more than 30% in an “exceptional” drought event.9 This drought has 
had a widespread, but unevenly distributed, impact on different sectors and water users, 
including farmers, industry, cities, and natural ecosystems that depend on water quantity, 
quality, and timing of flows (Gleick 2016).10 To mitigate the adverse impacts of drought, 
in April 2015 Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order mandating statewide 
reductions in water use by 25% in urban areas, which generally targeted residential 
water-use. We calculate one component of the mandate’s impacts by assessing its effect 
                                                     
9 For more information, see: 
http://droughtmonitor.unl.edu/Home/StateDroughtMonitor.aspx?CA. 
10 For more detail information about 1987-1992 drought consequences see Gleick and Nash 
1991; and Nash 1993, the 2007-2009 drought see Christian-Smith et al. 2011, and the 
current 2012-2015 drought see Cooley et al. 2015; and Gleick 2015. 
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on residential ratepayers in urban areas of Northern and Southern California. 
We construct a utility-level panel of monthly consumption data from 2004-2009 
for 111 utilities to estimate residential urban water demand. The demand estimation 
results provide price elasticities that are used to calculate the welfare consequences of the 
2015 drought mandate. Estimated elasticities for the sample utilities in Northern 
California are between -0.32 and -0.1; for the sample utilities in Southern California, 
estimated elasticities are between -0.50 and -0.1. Our empirical results indicate 
significant variation in the value of water across urban space.  
Two different policy options were defined and analyzed to estimate welfare losses 
experienced due to water restrictions, including (i) a 25% uniform cut-back across 
utilities during the mandate period (June 2015- February 2016), and (ii) utility-specific 
cut-backs based on the SWRCB program during the same mandate period. According to 
the estimated results, welfare losses per acre-foot are lowest under the SWRCB 
conservation program in Southern California and highest under the 25% uniform cut-
back in Northern California. We also calculate welfare results for a uniform restriction 
that achieves the same aggregate level of rationing as the SWRCB conservation program. 
This uniform policy is more efficient than the utility-specific restrictions imposed by the 
SWRCB conservation program. These results suggest that the SWRCB conservation 
program targets equity, rather than efficiency. Further, the efficiency losses are not so 
substantial, relative to the uniform policy. Based on the work of Buck et al. (2016), an 
efficient allocation of restrictions across utilities based on the marginal value of water for 
the last unit restricted, would not likely yield significant efficiency gains. 
The aggregate cost of the governor’s mandate in terms of lost consumer welfare is an 
33 
 
estimated $875 million. The cost to implement the water conservation mandate is $106 
million in the San Francisco Bay area and $769 million in Southern California. In other 
words, Northern California households have a WTP of $24 per month to avoid the 
conservation mandate. Put differently; these households are willing to see an increase in 
their water rates of 44% to avoid the conservation requirements. Households in Southern 
California have a WTP of $26 per month to avoid this mandate; they are willing to see a 
31% increase in their water rate to avoid the mandated cutbacks.  
The pattern of compliance with the SWRCB’s conservation program presents a 
puzzle. The data indicate that Northern and Southern California households reduced their 
water usage by a similar percentage: 23.3% in the Bay Area of Northern California and 
21.4% in Southern California. However, conservation targets in the Bay Area were 
significantly lower than in Southern California in both absolute and percentage terms. On 
average, consumers in Northern California over-complied with the conservation mandate, 
while those in Southern California slightly under-complied. Future research may help to 
better explain patterns of actual conservation during a drought and may shed light on 
whether the state was justified in setting such different percentage conservation targets 
for consumers in different regions. 
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2.6 Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Prices Per Acre-Foot by Utility in the Northern and Southern California  
Notes: Vertical axis in this figure shows the share of utilities in a given price bin. For 
example, approximately 50% of utilities in Southern California are in $1,000-$1,500 price 
bin. However, only 8% of utilities in Northern California are in the same price bin. It is 
noted that 27 utilities are used from Northern California; 26 utilities are from Southern. 
Mean, minimum, and maximum price per acre-foot in Northern California utilities are 
$2,513, $1,446, and, $4,217, respectively. These summary statistics for Southern 
California utilities are $1,526, $674, and $2,943, respectively. 
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Figure 2-2 Distribution of Estimated Price Elasticity of Water Demand by Region 
Notes: Elasticities are based on results reported in Column (5) of Table 2-3. The mean, 
minimum and maximum estimated price elasticities in Northern California utilities are -
0.16, -0.32, and -0.1; in Southern California utilities are -0.29, -0.50, and -0.1. Estimated 
price elasticities are truncated at -0.1. 
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Figure 2-3 Distribution of Mandated Conservation Across Utilities in Northern and 
Southern California  
Notes: Vertical axis in this figure shows percentage share of utilities in a given mandatory 
conservation standard bin. For example, approximately 40% of utilities in Northern 
California are required to conserve less than 10%. However, only approximately 4% of 
utilities in Southern California are required to conserve the same amount. The vertical 
dashed line indicates average mandatory cut-back in the sample utilities. Utilities in the 
Northern California (27 utilities) were required to cut-back water usage by 16.2%. 
Minimum and maximum cut-back for these utilities respectively are 8% and 36%. Utilities 
in the Southern California (26 utilities) were required to cut-back water usage by 22.5%. 
Minimum and maximum cutbacks for these utilities respectively are 8% and 36%. 
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Figure 2-4 Heterogeneity in Welfare Losses for Urban Water Utilities Located in 
Northern and Southern California. 
Notes: For the study sample, utility-specific restrictions result in an overall cutback of 
16.2% in Northern California and 22.5% in Southern California. Per acre-foot welfare loss 
under 25% uniform restriction lies between $3,318 and $12,926 in Northern California. 
For southern California, this number lies between $883 and $9,569. Under utility-specific 
restrictions per acre-foot welfare loss in Northern California lies between $2,111 and 
$15,028 and in Southern California, this range is between $859 and $11,808. 
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Table 2-1 Urban Water Utilities Conservation Tiers and Count of the Utilities in each 
Tier 
Tier R-GPCD Range # of Suppliers 
in Range 
Conservation Standard 
From To 
1 
  
4 4% 
2 0 64.99 27 8% 
3 65 79.99 23 12% 
4 80 94.99 42 16% 
5 95 109.99 61 20% 
6 110 129.99 45 24% 
7 130 169.99 81 28% 
8 170 214.99 61 32% 
9 215 612.00 67 36% 
Notes: The mandate aim is to reduce the amount of water consumed statewide in urban 
areas by 25% relative to 2013 levels – roughly 1.3 million acre-foot of water. A total of 
411 urban water utilities are required to reduce water supply (sum of Column (4) in Table 
2-1).  
R-GPCD: Residential Gallons Per Capita Day 
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Table 2-2 Average Monthly Household Water Consumption In 2009 From Regression 
Dataset (Unit: CCF/Month) 
Region Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Total utilities  
in the sample 
Average 
monthly 
17.50 8.40 4.06 52.87 
Arid season 23.40 11.57 0.43 68.95 
Wet season 17.58 8.73 0.25 69.51 
      
Sample utilities in 
the  
Northern California 
Average 
monthly 
11.98 7.97 4.063 52.87 
Arid season 16.55 10.41 0.44 66.02 
Wet season 11.72 6.27 0.25 52.87 
      
Sample utilities in 
the  
Southern California  
Average 
monthly 
19.07 7.83 7.74 52.80 
Arid season 25.30 11.16 4.73 68.95 
Wet season 19.17 8.61 2.88 69.51 
Notes: Average monthly household water consumption on a CCF basis lies between 5 to 
15 CCF in Northern California and between 12 and 25 in Southern California.  
 
CCF: hundred cubic feet 
S.D: Standard deviation  
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Table 2-3 Monthly Residential Water Demand Estimation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Ln(Price) -0.198** -0.207** -0.23* -0.184* -2.100** 
 (0.0992) (0.100) (0.105) (0.103) (1.087) 
Ln(Price) X Ln(Income) - - - - 0.458* 
     (0.268) 
Observations 4,176 4,176 4,104 468 4,104 
R-squared 0.021 0.543 0.543 0.282 0.543 
Year Fixed Effects (Y=6) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Utility Fixed Effects (U=111) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Weather Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Fixed Effects (M=9) No Yes Yes No Yes 
County Specific t, t2 (C=9) No No Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Huber-White standard errors estimated using the Huber-White method and reported 
in parentheses; multi-way clustered standard errors are approximately the same as Huber-
White standard errors. Multi-way clustered standard errors are clustered by year and utility. 
Implied price elasticity using Column (5) specification indicates that own price elasticity 
in an urban water utility with a median household income of $65,000 would be -0.19. Note 
that $65,000 is the weighted median income by using an average number of households in 
each utility service area as a weight.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1. 
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Table 2-4 Average Forecasted Welfare Losses Per Acre-Foot of Restriction by Scenario 
Scenario 
Average 
welfare loss 
per acre-foot 
Scenario 1: Uniform restriction (25%) 
 
 
$5,094 
[$3,138] 
 
 
Scenario 2: Utility-specific restrictions 
      (State Water Resources Control Board     
Conservation Program) 
$3,846 
[$3,004] 
 
  
Notes: The standard deviation for mean welfare losses per acre-foot across 53 urban water 
utilities is reported in square brackets. The numbers reported in the square brackets are not 
standard errors; instead, they are the standard deviations associated with the calculation of 
mean welfare loss per acre-foot for the 53 urban water utilities. Marginal loss per acre-foot 
is truncated at $20,000.  
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Table 2-5 Welfare Losses Under Uniform Restriction (25%) and Utility-Specific 
Restrictions from the SWRCB Conservation Program 
Panel A: Northern California Utilities  
Policy restriction scenario: 
Uniform Restriction  
(25%) 
Utility-specific 
Restrictions  
(resulting overall  
cut-back of 16.2%) 
Uniform Restriction  
(16.2%) 
Total loss ($ millions) $182 $106 $69 
[95% Bootstrapped C.I.] [$160-$230] [$100-$109] 43[$56-$80] 
Average loss ($/AF)  $6,726 $6,107 $3,983 
[95% Bootstrapped C.I.] [$5,914-$8,471] [$5,773-$6,263] [$3,238-$4,626] 
Household WTP($/Month) 
* 
42 24 16 
% increases in 
expenditures* 
75 44 28 
Panel B: Southern California Utilities  
Policy restriction scenario: 
Uniform Restriction  
(25%) 
Utility-specific 
Restrictions  
(resulting overall  
cut-back of 22.5%) 
Uniform Restriction  
(22.5%) 
Total loss ($ millions) $1,010 $769 $872 
[95% Bootstrapped C.I.] [$759-$2,098] [$600-$1,435] [$668-$1,685] 
Average loss ($/AF)  $2,832 $2,757 $2,654 
[95% Bootstrapped C.I.] [$2,126-$5,875] [$2,154-$5,150] [$2,032-$5,128] 
Household WTP($/month) 34 26 29 
% increases in expenditures 41 31 36 
Notes: For Northern California Utilities in the panel the quantity-weighted average price is 
$2,236 ($/AF), the household-weighted average price elasticity of demand is -0.17, total 
residential demand from June-February in 2013 is 108,457 (AF), and a total number of 
single-family residential households is 485,892. In Southern California Utilities the 
quantity-weighted average price is $1,709 ($/AF), the household-weighted average 
elasticity is -0.29, total residential demand from June-February is 1,428,380 (AF), and a 
total number of single-family residential households is 3,314,653. Square brackets report 
95% confidence intervals for estimates of total welfare losses and average welfare losses 
per acre-foot of supply restriction. Because the elasticity estimates enter non-linearly into 
the welfare expression, these are bootstrapped confidence intervals with bootstrapping 
clustered at water utility level. The household WTP measure divides the total loss reported 
in the first row by the total number of single-family residential households in the region. 
The % increase in expenditures uses the welfare loss estimates to calculate how much 
households would be willing to increase their existing expenditures in percentage terms to 
avoid the percent restriction identified at the top of the corresponding column. WTP and 
percentage increases in expenditures are calculated only for the single-family residential 
sector. Marginal losses are truncated at $20,000.  
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Table 2-6 Average Predicted and Actual Welfare Losses ($/AF) in Northern California 
Notes: Utilities that exceed the mandatory conservation requirement are indicated with 
italics. MID = Municipal Improvement District; CWD = County Water District; MWD = 
Metropolitan Water District; CWS = California Water Service. * indicates no data 
available. Brisbane and Purissima Hills are not required to cut-back. All welfare loss 
calculations capped marginal welfare loss per acre-foot at $20,000.  
                                                     
11 R-GPCD= Residential Gallons Per Capita Day.  
12 Monthly R-GPCD for 9-month (June-February) of 2013 is calculated using monthly RGPCD and 
monthly percent saved data which is publicly available on the State Water Resources Control Board 
(SWRCB) website. 
13 The SWRCB monthly R-GPCD data is averaged over the period of June 2015 and February 2016. 
Northern California 
Estimated 
average R-
GPCD11,12 
(y2013) 
Estimated 
average R-
GPCD13 
(y2015) 
Mandatory 
restriction 
relative to 
y2013 (%) 
Observed 
reduction 
relative to 
y2013 (%) 
Predicted 
welfare 
loss 
($/AF) 
Actual 
welfare 
loss 
($/AF) 
CWS So. SF 49 40 8% 20% 2,111 2,998 
East Palo Alto  57 44 8% 24% 2,320 3,248 
Estero MID 67 57 12% 15% 2,322 2,702 
Alameda CWD 90 65 16% 28% 2,574 4,887 
SFPUC 48 41 8% 15% 2,730 3,232 
Milpitas* NA 59 12% NA 2,731 2,731 
Santa Clara  79 62 16% 22% 2,973 4,047 
Hayward  63 48 8% 23% 3,016 4,262 
Menlo Park MWD 109 65 16% 42% 3,120 10,938 
Redwood  73 56 8% 24% 3,268 7,380 
Westborough  58 44 8% 26% 3,584 10,328 
CWS Mid-Peninsula  77 57 16% 26% 3,683 6,564 
Daly City  61 54 8% 12% 3,689 4,191 
San Jose MWS 97 70 20% 28% 3,709 6,455 
San Bruno  56 43 8% 24% 3,752 6,508 
Mountain View  81 56 16% 31% 3,893 8,642 
North Coast CWD 55 42 8% 24% 4,073 8,786 
Millbrae  80 61 16% 23% 4,075 5,789 
Sunnyvale  79 56 16% 28% 4,648 9,675 
Coastside CWD 69 54 8% 21% 4,924 9,861 
Burlingame  83 59 16% 29% 7,263 12,284 
Mid-Peninsula  96 70 20% 26% 7,441 10,022 
Palo Alto  105 75 24% 31% 9,277 11,703 
CWS Bear Gulch 174 113 36% 35% 11,729 11,432 
Hillsborough  260 148 36% 42% 15,028 15,710 
Average 74.2 57.0 16.2% 23.3% 4,717 7,375
 
Aggregate Welfare  
Loss ($ millions) 
- - - - 129 265 
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Table 2-7 Average Predicted and Actual Welfare Losses ($/AF) in Southern California.  
Southern California 
Estimated 
average R-
GPCD14,15 
(y2013) 
Estimated 
average R-
GPCD16 
(y2015) 
Mandatory 
restriction 
relative to 
y2013 (%) 
Observed 
reduction 
relative to 
y2013 (%) 
Predicted 
welfare 
loss ($) 
Actual 
welfare 
loss ($) 
Burbank 117 87 24% 25% 859 890 
Compton 61 54 8% 12% 1,170 1,235 
Anaheim 96 75 20% 22% 1,292 1,356 
Long Beach 74 63 16% 15% 1,302 1,284 
USGV MWD* 119 92 32% 27% 1,353 1,273 
Santa Ana 71 79 12% 17% 1,407 1,531 
San Fernando 108 86 24% 20% 1,422 1,330 
Glendale 102 80 20% 21% 1,655 1,701 
Fullerton 116 93 28% 20% 1,738 1,376 
IEUA* 131 100 28% 23% 1,757 1,534 
Central Basin MWD* 64 52 16% 18% 2,050 2,087 
Eastern MWD 112 92 28% 18% 2,080 1,722 
Western MWD*  150 115 32% 23% 2,223 1,781 
Pasadena 123 99 28% 21% 2,262 1,910 
Three Valleys MWD* 121 96 28% 24% 2,408 2,049 
MWD Orange County* 106 82 24% 23% 2,451 2,380 
Torrance 98 77 20% 20% 2,761 2,761 
West Basin MWD* 121 98 20% 15% 2,845 2,454 
San Diego CWA* 106 80 16% 19% 3,087 3,177 
Santa Monica 90 71 20% 21% 3,433 3,498 
Calleguas MWD* 141 103 21% 20% 3,433 3,313 
Los Angeles 85 72 16% 16% 3,515 3,496 
Foothill MWD* 214 160 24% 26% 6,121 5,300 
Las Virgenes MWD 211 155 36% 29% 9,914 7,349 
Beverly Hills 178 144 32% 19% 11,808 6,638 
       
Average 107.4 84.4 22.5% 21.4% 2,974 2,537 
Aggregate Welfare 
 Loss ($ millions) 
- - - - 916 794 
Notes: Utilities that exceed the mandatory conservation requirement are indicated with italics. 
MWD = Metropolitan Water District; IEUA = Inland Empire Utilities Agency; USGV = Upper 
San Gabriel Valley; * For each wholesale utility we collect required information on every local 
utility within the wholesale utility and calculate an average. San Marino is not required to reduce 
consumption. All welfare loss calculations cap marginal welfare loss per acre-foot at $20,000. 
                                                     
14 R-GPCD= Residential Gallons Per Capita Day.  
15 R-GPCD for 9-month (June-February) of 2013 is calculated using monthly RGPCD and monthly percent saved data 
which is publicly available on the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) website. 
16 The SWRCB monthly R-GPCD data is averaged over the period of June 2015 and February 2016. 
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Chapter 3. HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF REAL-TIME CONSUMPTION 
ANALYTICS ON RESIDENTIAL WATER CONSUMPTION 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper estimates how web-based Home Water Use Reports (HWURs) 
affect household-level water consumption in Folsom City, California. The HWURs under 
study, offered by the company Dropcountr (DC), share social comparisons, consumption 
analytics, and conservation information to residential accounts, primarily through digital 
communications. The data utilized in this paper is a daily panel tracking single-family 
residential households from January-2013 to May-2017. We found that there is a 7.8% 
reduction in average daily household water consumption for a typical household who 
enrolled in DC program. Results suggest that the effect of DC varies by the baseline 
consumption quintile, the number of months in the program, the day of the week, quartile 
of the year, message type, and enrollment wave. We also conduct empirical tests to 
evaluate the channels through which DC may act to reduce consumption. Results indicate 
these responses to DC program likely come from the information channel rather than 
moral suasion. Furthermore, our results indicate that providing consumption and pricing 
information may not improve the effectiveness of non-linear pricing. 
 
Keywords: Automated meters, Non-price conservation, Social-norms, Urban water 
demand, moral suasion, marginal pricing  
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3.1 Introduction  
 
Public utilities in arid regions struggle to balance supply and demand of water resources 
both in the short-term and long-term. Most of California's water suppliers in 2015, for 
example, were required to reduce water use to achieve a 25 percent mandatory reduction 
level17. In addition to these short-term policies, water suppliers are required to comply 
with longer-term policies, such as the California Water Action Plan(CWAP)18. 
Specifically, the CWAP provides strategies for enhancing water use efficiency and 
conservation. One of its objectives is to “strengthen water conservation programs to a 
level comparable to those of energy utilities.” In addition to CWAP, California's 20x2020 
Water Conservation Plan of 200819 requires utilities to make 20 percent reductions in 
water use by 2020. The primary reason for consideration of conservation is financial; 
conservation reduces water consumption in a cost-effective and less politically sensitive 
manner than developing new supplies or reallocating from agriculture to the urban sector 
(Kenney 2014, Kenney, Mazzone, and Bedingfield 2010).  
Utilities use a variety of tools to meet conservation goals-- including price 
adjustments, outdoor water use restrictions, and efficient appliances rebate programs 
(Olmstead 2010). Relying on price adjustments to reduce household water demand results 
in uncertainty in revenue forecasting for utilities and stirs political rancor due to equity 
concerns for this essential good. Rebate programs may not be cost-effective (Bennear et 
al. 2013, Brent, Cook, and Olsen 2015) and water use restrictions are costly. For instance, 
                                                     
17http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/water_issues/programs/drought/docs/04011
5_executive_order.pdf  
18http://resources.ca.gov/california_water_action_plan  
19 http://www.water.ca.gov/wateruseefficiency/sb7/docs/20x2020plan.pdf  
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Buck, Nemati, and Sunding (2016b) find that California’s mandatory restriction in 2015-
2016, resulted in economic losses of over $1 billion and cost households an average of 
$25 per month.  
The most appealing non-pecuniary conservation programs are “social-norm-
based” ones. These programs seek to alter households' decisions by providing 
consumption information -- which often includes the households' consumption behavior 
and comparison to their neighbors. Although there is limited academic evidence available 
as to whether these programs cost-effectively reduce water consumption, initial research 
suggests significant potential. Moreover, debate persists in the academic literature as to 
the significance of and the type of (average versus marginal) price effects on 
consumption decisions. Generating frequent and highly granular micro-level household 
data through partnerships between a digital social comparison product and water service 
providers will improve academic and policy-maker information around decision-making 
over residential water demand management programming.   Well-designed experiments 
and partnerships have the potential to reduce consumption, while also providing more 
precise estimates about how various price and non-price management tools, as well as 
household characteristics, determine water consumption.  Additionally, such information 
could be leveraged not only to direct more effective and efficient water management 
strategies but also to enable improved forecasting of future water demand, which is 
necessary for determining optimal state and regional regulatory and infrastructure 
choices. Hence, this type of research is important in developing solutions to water 
resource challenges that are impactful, cost-effective, and efficient. 
This paper will contribute to a substantial body of similar research in the energy sector 
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and growing but less advanced work in social comparison programs for the water sector.  
Experimental designs in numerous markets with Opower, an information sharing, and 
social comparison tool used in residential electricity management programming, have 
allowed for a multitude of research questions to be explored on residential energy 
consumption.  In general, these findings show an economically and statistically 
significant average treatment effect, with evidence of heterogeneous impacts and 
advantages over other programs in reducing energy consumption in a cost-effective 
manner (Allcott 2011, Allcott and Rogers 2014, Allcott and Taubinsky 2015, Ayres, 
Raseman, and Shih 2013, Costa and Kahn 2013). Other social norm-based programs in 
the electricity sector also found similar results (Pellerano et al. 2017). Limited academic 
analysis has been generated in the water sector, however; the authors are aware of only a 
few analyses published in peer-reviewed academic journals, which examined the effect of 
WaterSmart services in three Californian utilities (Brent, Cook, and Olsen 2015), a single 
program in Cobb County, Georgia (Bernedo, Ferraro, and Price 2014, Ferraro and 
Miranda 2013, Ferraro, Miranda, and Price 2011, Ferraro and Price 2013), and a program 
in San Diego (Schultz et al. 2014). Shortly, we discuss results of all these experiments—
including Opower, WaterSmart, and Cobb County- in greater detail.  
In this paper, we examine the effect of a social-norm-based conservation program 
on households' water usage. The program under study is administered by Dropcountr 
(DC), a mobile and web application that informs customers of their water consumption, 
relative to their neighbors. Specifically, DC provides (i) current water usage, (ii) a 
comparison to previous usage, (iii) comparison to similar nearby households, and (iv) the 
efficient budget for households. Also, it also provides tips about where households can 
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save water and connects them to existing water utility rebate programs on water saving 
appliances. DC also monitors households' hourly water usage data to identify possible 
leaks in their water system.  They use unexpected boosts in water consumption as a signal 
of a leak in the households' water system and send an email message or phone alert to the 
customer. Hence, DC is designed to motivate households to reduce their water use by 
changing their behavior, adopting water efficient technologies or finding leaks. DC 
differs from other similar programs in the water sector because of their emphasis on 
leveraging digital communication platforms, rather than paper reports, which allows for 
greater flexibility in message content and more frequent and varied content. Also, the DC 
platform is connected to the households' Smart meter. This option allows DC to provide 
real-time information to customers.  
We analyze the effect of DC program on water consumption in the City of 
Folsom, CA. The data utilized for this analysis includes two years of historical daily 
consumption, along with 29 months of data under the DC pilot program, spanning 
January 2013 through May 2017. DC designed this program as an opt-in program. 
Therefore, analysis of a treatment effect is challenged by this non-experimental design.  
However, various statistical tools will be explored to minimize the challenges of 
interpreting results. 
To preview the results, we find evidence that DC has a statistically and 
economically significant conserving effect on water consumption at the household level 
for customers who enrolled in the service. The estimated Average Treatment Effect 
Under Treated (ATOT) is a 7.8% reduction in daily consumption. Given the overall price 
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elasticity for the single-family residential sector is around -0.2320, 7.8% reduction in daily 
consumption is comparable to an almost 34% increases in prices. There appears to be a 
stronger effect for those households identified as high-water consumers in the summer of 
the baseline period. This paper also finds evidence of a “boomerang effect”' (i.e., an 
increase in average water use) for those households in the lower portion of baseline 
distribution. We also find evidence of heterogeneity in the effect of DC by day of the 
week, message type, etc.  These results are for the City of Folsom, CA with opt-in 
program design. The precise magnitude of a DC effect on household water consumption 
will vary both by location, experimental design and by time-specific conditions, such as 
weather conditions and variations in other determinants of water use that correlate with 
time and location.  
This paper proceeds as follows: Section two discusses relevant academic 
literature; Section three offers an overview of the DC business model and description of 
services; Section four describes data; Section five describes empirical method and results; 
the paper concludes with a discussion, summary, and policy implications in Section six. 
3.2 Relevant Literature  
 
This paper has relevance to existing literature in two particular areas: estimating the 
effect of social comparison on consumption decisions, in general, and understanding the 
determinants of residential water demand, in particular. Price response in household 
water consumption has been studied extensively in the academic literature. Debate 
persists in how decision-makers are affected by both the qualitative aspects of price 
                                                     
20 This elasticity is reported in (Buck, Nemati, and Sunding 2016b). This is one elasticity 
from the literature and is not from our sample 
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(block rates versus uniform pricing and average versus marginal) and the quantitative 
changes (estimating elasticities) (Dalhuisen et al. 2003, Ito 2014, Olmstead, Hanemann, 
and Stavins 2007). However, price instruments to reduce residential demand are 
considered a political liability, complicate revenue estimation for utilities, and inspire 
concerns over the impacts to lower-income households (Agthe and Billings 1987). 
Additionally, it is widely understood that other factors determine residential water 
demand, such as income, household size, lot size, landscaping, and weather. Buck, 
Soldati, and Sunding (2015) use a data-driven process to identify model performance in 
predicting residential water demand, which reveals that price is not necessarily the most 
important determinant. 
Consistent with this, utilities often employ non-price demand-side management 
(DSM) strategies to influence household water consumption. Renwick and Green (2000) 
estimate the effects of six different categories of non-price DSM policies, which include 
information and rebate opportunities. Not surprisingly, they find that mandatory policies 
result in larger demand reductions, relative to voluntary programs. They also identify 
areas where more research is needed, including the effect of household characteristics 
and multiple, simultaneous policy tools on aggregate demand. Services, such as DC, 
which have the technological flexibility to vary signals, can amass frequent, granular data 
that can be used to fill knowledge gaps. Additionally, recent research has estimated 
household willingness-to-pay to avoid water service disruptions for some California 
utilities (Buck et al. 2016, Buck, Nemati, and Sunding 2016a). These estimates may help 
utilities evaluate the possible conservation benefits through various categories of 
messaging, including social norms, information, and pro-social language 
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Social comparison of household consumption began in the residential electricity 
sector. The leading figure in this movement has been Opower, which partners with 
utilities to create content with the objective of reducing household electricity demand and 
improving efficiency and conservation. A growing collection of research in this field has 
provided estimates of program effectiveness, as well as evaluating the persistence of 
treatment and examining site selection bias (Allcott 2015, Allcott and Rogers 2014, 
Ayres, Raseman, and Shih 2013). These analyses estimate treatment effects in the range 
of 1.2 -3.3%, which varies according to location and program implementation but appears 
to persist over time. Research on heterogeneous effects suggests that targeted content that 
considers sub-population attributes improves messaging response (Costa and Kahn 2013). 
Allcott (2015) identifies a problem in site and population selection bias, where program 
evaluation of early-adopting utilities overstates the treatment effect, relative to 
implementation across less environmentally progressive regions and populations.  
This business model of combining social, behavior, and data science to impact 
household decision-making is being replicated in the water sector. WaterSmart Software 
has been building partnerships with water utilities in California, as well as other states, 
for the past several years. In one analysis, this service has been shown to cause a 5% 
reduction in average consumption for two California markets, with no statistically 
significant effect in a third (Brent, Cook, and Olsen 2015). A 2007 randomized 
experiment in Cobb County, Georgia found strong evidence that social comparison 
messages had a substantially larger impact than pro-social content and technical 
recommendations (Ferraro and Price 2013). They find an estimated 4.8% effect when 
treatment combines social comparison, pro-social messaging, and technical suggestions. 
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Both the WaterSmart program and Georgia study find significant heterogeneity in 
treatment effect across household types, while only the WaterSmart analysis observes 
stable persistence in treatment effect over time. DC differs from both of these programs 
for their emphasis on leveraging digital communication platforms, rather than paper 
reports, which allows for greater flexibility in message content, more frequent and varied 
content, and the option to survey customer feedback. 
We analyze the effect of enrollment in DC service on daily water consumption in 
the City of Folsom, CA. We provide evidence that the DC effect in the water sector is 
comparable to and even larger than, Opower’s effect in the energy sector. Also, we 
examine the heterogeneity in the treatment effect. Understanding variation in treatment 
effects of DC helps target subgroups in a cost-effective manner. Also, this result helps 
researchers understand the generalizability of the treatment effects to different 
populations and places (Djebbari and Smith 2008, Ferraro and Miranda 2013, Heckman, 
Smith, and Clements 1997, Imai and Ratkovic 2013, Manski 2004). 
3.3 Overview of Dropcountr Services  
 
DC users have access to water usage and other information anytime via their mobile 
devices (iOS and Android) or by logging into their account on the web. In addition, DC 
sends users a monthly email summary of their water use, including contextual 
comparisons and water utility announcements. While DC can and does work with 
utilities, who read their meters monthly or bi-monthly, DC is especially well suited for 
utilities who have migrated to smart metering. 
Users who have downloaded the mobile application receive ``push'' notifications 
to their mobile devices. These notifications can alert households when they may be 
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approaching the next tier for a block-pricing utility, an indication of leaks, rebate 
opportunities or other tips. The web platform allows customers to access their DC 
account, where they can explore their monthly report in more detail and access similar 
information that may be generated through the mobile alerts. Additionally, DC will 
produce and mail paper water use reports for utilities that request it.  
The “Your Water” interface on both mobile and web apps includes four main 
features: summary statistics of usage, which includes reference to an individualized 
“goal”; comparison of usage to “similar” and “efficient” households; and conservation 
tips tailored to their account characteristics. An example of this interface can be found in 
Figure 3-1. 
The top portion provides statistics on monthly and average daily consumption, 
along with a graphical representation of their historical consumption over the previous 
12-month period. Also, this portion of the report evaluates the households' performance 
in achieving their “goal” water usage. A goal is an account-specific value and represents 
the amount of water required by the account each month of the year. The goal is the sum 
of an indoor budget, primarily determined by household occupancy, and an outdoor 
budget, which based on parcel size, irrigable area and local weather and other climate 
factors, such as local evapotranspiration constants. The industry standard and baseline 
assumption is that 50% of parcel area is irrigated; households may update this irrigation 
profile, along with other household features, in their DC account.  
The social comparison component informs customers how their usage compares 
to “similar” or “nearby” households and “efficient” households. A “similar/nearby” 
household lies within a specified radius of the given account and is comparable in 
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features, such as lot size and household occupancy. Households with consumption below 
a certain percentile of the distribution are labeled “efficient” by DC. DC also provides 
“Relevant water saving tips” portion as a part of the report that encourages water savings 
by suggesting two conservation tips per the report, out of over 100 recommendations, 
which are tailored to that particular household’s profile and past use. Finally, customers 
are encouraged to log into their online account, where they may explore their report in 
greater detail and receive further conservation information. 
3.4 Data Sources and Description 
3.4.1 Enrollment process and enrollment definition  
 
In mid-December of 2014, all account holders in the City of Folsom water utility service 
area were offered the option of participating in the DC pilot program on a “first come, 
first served” basis. The offer of service came as a paper advertisement, on city letterhead, 
with a monthly bill and included a market insert that illustrated the look and style of the 
DC web and mobile platforms. The utility contracted for a maximum of 5,000 accounts, 
with a current enrollment of just over 3,350 accounts. The City of Folsom water utility 
initiated their DC program in December 2014, and enrollment in the program has 
increased over time. 
Progression of DC enrollment over the post-DC period is presented in Figure 3-2. 
The initial pulse of enrollment was spurred, in part, by direct email when the program 
was first rolled out. Beyond the initial email, the DC program has been promoted 
continually on the website of the utility. Households can sign up for DC through the DC 
website or use the DC mobile application from the Apple or Android app stores.   
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For this analysis, households who participated in the DC service offer at any point 
during the study period will be referred to as ``treated'' households, while those who do 
not are “control” households. The first full month after which a household has received 
their first DC report is considered the first treatment month. Therefore, since enrollment 
began in December 2014, the first reports were generated in January 2015, which makes 
January 2015 the first possible treatment month. This approach is consistent in defining 
treatment for both Opower and WaterSmart program analysis. The rate of enrollment, 
using this definition of treatment, is represented in Figure 3-2.   
3.4.2 Summary statistics  
 
Summary statistics for the data used in this analysis is presented in Table 3-1. The 
average in the baseline period is 589.54 gallons per day. The enrolled group includes 
3,353 households, and the never enrolled group includes 16,171 households. Balance in 
observable variables in the pre-DC period between never enrolled and enrolled group is 
prerequisite to investigate DC effect using the Difference-in-Differences method. 
Because of data limitation on demographic information of control households in the study 
we only use water consumption in the pre-DC period to check for the balance. As shown 
in Table 3-1, the difference between average consumption of enrolled and never enrolled 
groups is -1.79 gallons per day. A simple t-test shows that mean pre-DC consumption 
values are not statistically different between these two groups.  
Further investigation of the pre-trends between never enrolled and enrolled groups 
is analyzed using graphical analysis. Panel (a) in Figure 3-3 presents average water 
consumption (gallons per day) in the enrolled and never enrolled groups with a vertical 
dashed line which indicates the DC start time. This graph illustrates that, despite 
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differences in average consumption across the treated and control groups before DC, 
there exists a visually distinct increase in this difference in average monthly consumption 
between treated and control households, following the introduction of DC service 
(indicated by the vertical dashed line). In other words, we observe graphical evidence that 
there is a larger difference in average water usage after DC between those households 
that enrolled in DC and those that did not enroll.  
We observe this difference more clearly by plotting the difference in average 
monthly consumption as a percent difference between the two groups across the sample 
time horizon. Panel (b) Figure 3-3 illustrates how this percent difference changes across 
the sample period. Reflecting the pattern observed in panel (a) of the same figure we see 
that there is a significant increase in the difference in average consumption as a percent 
between the pre-period, before the availability of DC services, and the post-period, with 
households under DC treatment. In the pre-period, we observe that enrolled and never 
enrolled households consume approximately the same water on average. Whereas, in the 
post-period, households who are in the enrolled group consumed about 6% less water, on 
average. 
Figure 3-4 illustrates how the difference between treated and control groups 
changes across households with different baseline consumption levels. For this figure, 
quintiles of consumption are defined based on the average baseline summer usage. 
Quintiles thresholds, in average gallons per day, are 401.00 and lower as the first quintile, 
between 401.00 and 646.32 as the second, between 646.32 and 797.92 as the third, 
between 797.92 and 1,077.19 as the fourth, and higher than 1,077.19 as the fifth quintile. 
This figure illustrates that there are larger increases in the difference in average monthly 
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consumption between treated and control households, following the introduction of DC 
service, for the higher quintiles. 
In addition to this graphical evidence of parallel trends, various fixed effects are 
employed to account for weekly, seasonal, annual, and household invariant factors that 
may determine consumption. Given the extensive amount of baseline data and number of 
observations, these fixed effects can explain a significant amount of variation that could 
otherwise bias the results. For regression analysis purpose, we organize a panel dataset of 
household-level daily water consumption in the City of Folsom water utility service area. 
City of Folsom panel begins January-2013 and ends in May-2017, this period includes 
the start date of the DC service (December-2014).  The regression results measure the 
effect of DC, taking into account household characteristics that also affect consumption 
(e.g., lot size) as well as any seasonal or year-specific effects on consumption. The 
average effect of DC enrollment on water consumption is estimated by defining two 
groups; households who enrolled in DC (treated households) and households who did not 
enroll in DC (control households). 
3.5 Empirical Method and Results  
The figures and tables presented in the previous section motivate the empirical strategy 
for this paper. Table 3-2 provides the basic double difference results and indicates that 
water consumption in treated households was reduced on average by 32.04 gallons per 
day, which is equivalent to 6.65% of average daily usage. 
Note that in the double difference method with no additional controls, we assume 
that enrollment in DC is randomly assigned. This assumption means that our estimation 
result is not suffering from omitted variable bias. However, this assumption is naïve. For 
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instance, in this estimation, we are omitting household-specific characteristics, like 
environmental consciousness, that are related to both enrollments in DC program and 
water consumption. The goal is to estimate the causal effect of enrollment in DC program 
on water consumption. The primary challenges to estimating this effect are that many 
observable and unobservable factors affect enrollment in DC program and water 
consumption which -- if unaccounted for-- could lead to omitted variable bias in 
estimates of the DC effect on water consumption. Identifying this effect is challenging 
because the program is voluntary.  
Diagnostics that we used to address this challenge include balance in pre-DC 
usage conditional on controls. Smart water meters which record hourly water 
consumption gives us the opportunity to explore DC effect using high-frequency data. 
Rich data set of household level daily water consumption allows us to include various 
fixed effects and control for unobservable factors. Specifically, in our preferred 
specification, we estimate the following equation: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑) = 𝛼1. 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟ℎ𝑑 + 𝛾ℎ𝑚 + 𝜇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿𝑑 + ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑   (1) 
 
In equation (1), the outcome of interest is the log of the household h water 
consumption in year y, month m, and day d (log(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑)). The variable of interest is 
Dropcountr which denotes whether a household observation is in the enrolled group 
during the post period in which DC was active. 𝛾ℎ𝑚 indicates household-calendar month 
fixed effects, 𝜇𝑚𝑦 indicates calendar-month year fixed effects, and 𝛿𝑑 day of the week 
fixed effects. ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑 captures all unobservables which affect the dependent variable. 
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3.5.1 The average effect of Dropcountr  
Results for the difference-in-differences with different sets of controls are presented in 
Table 3-3. Log of household-level daily water consumption is the dependent variable in 
all of the specifications. Standard errors for all the specifications are reported in 
parentheses and are clustered at the level of the households to account for within-
household serial correlation in the error term and produce consistent standard errors in 
the presence of such correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004).  In column (1), 
we include only Dropcountr which is defined by an interaction between post-period and 
enrolled households, post-period, and a treated household identifier. As expected, without 
controlling for a month and household-specific characteristics, we find a substantial and 
negative effect of DC on water consumption. In column (2), we add control for time-
invariant household characteristics by adding household fixed effects. Comparing with 
previous specification point estimate for DC effect in column (2) is closer to zero. Not 
controlling for household-specific time-invariant characteristics, such as lot size, results 
in bias in our point estimates away from zero. One justification for this would be, for 
example, lot size is negatively related to enrollment in DC program and positively 
associated with our dependent variable (average daily water consumption).  
In column (3), in addition to household fixed effects, by adding month by year 
fixed effects, we control for consumption factors which are common to all household 
within a given calendar month for a specific year, e.g., 2015-16 water restrictions 
administered by the California Water Resources Control Board. Comparing results of this 
specification to column (2) results indicates that controlling for these types of omitted 
variables significantly changes our point estimate of enrollment in DC effect on 
consumption. In fact, not controlling for these factors bias our point estimates away from 
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zero. For instance, 2015-16 water restrictions have a negative impact on consumption, 
and it is likely that this factor is positively correlated with enrollment in DC program. In 
our preferred specification, in addition to controlling for a month by year fixed effects, 
we control for the household by month fixed effects. This type of fixed effects controls 
for time-constant variables specific to a household and also calendar month specific 
water-use factors specific to each household. We also use the day of the week fixed 
effects which control for omitted unobservable variables which are constant over time 
and specific to each day of the week. Examples of these type of variables would be 
watering restrictions, weekends, etc. Results of this specification are reported in column 
(4). 
Results in column (4) of this table indicate that, on average, households who 
enrolled in DC program reduced daily water consumption by 7.8%. This result is both 
statistically and economically significant, meaning we can reject the hypothesis that there 
is no effect of DC enrollment on daily water consumption. The change in average gallons 
per day is an estimated 46.01 fewer gallons for the average enrolled household. To put 
these reductions in perspective: the average shower uses 16-40 gallons (depending on 
shower head efficiency), clothes washing machines require 25-40 gallons per wash, while 
dishwashers use 6-16 gallons per load. Also, the estimates reported here are comparable 
with those found for WaterSmart Software of a 4.9-5.1% average treatment effect for two 
experimental designs (where no effect was found for a third utility) (Brent et al., 2015).  
Notably, although the previous graphs suggest that all households reduced 
consumption in the post-period, the controls in our regression analysis allow 
identification of DC's effect on household consumption that takes this general reduction 
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into account. Thus, we find that DC treated households reduced consumption during the 
post-period more than households who did not enroll in DC. Taking into account baseline 
differences and controlling for consumption factors as described in the discussion of the 
econometric model presented in equation (1). 
3.5.2 Investigating Heterogeneity  
In this section, we move beyond estimation of average DC effects, and we consider 
estimating heterogeneity of household's responses to the DC program. Understanding 
heterogeneity of DC effect will allow targeting households that are more responsive, 
which will be a cost-effective strategy (Djebbari and Smith 2008, Ferraro and Miranda 
2013, Heckman, Smith, and Clements 1997). Also, investigating DC effect by subgroups 
helps researchers understand generalizability of the result of this study to other 
populations and places (Ferraro and Miranda 2013, Imai and Ratkovic 2013, Manski 
2004). 
3.5.2.1 Baseline consumption levels  
We explore heterogeneity of DC effect by average summer baseline (pre-) period water 
consumption. In this study, we defined summer as May-September months (inclusive). 
For each household, we calculate the mean summer pre-DC water consumption. Next, we 
create dummy variables for whether that mean summer pre-DC water consumption is in 
the first, second, third, fourth, or fifth quintile of the whole sample summer pre-DC 
consumption (i.e., Q.1, Q.2, etc.). Next, we interact these dummies with enrolled 
household and time dummy indicators. We defined baseline consumption quintiles as 
20% and lower, between 20% and 40%, between 40% and 60%, between 60% and 80%, 
and higher than 80% percentiles. Quintiles thresholds, in average gallons per day, are 
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401.00 and lower as the first quintile, between 401.00 and 646.32 as the second, between 
646.32 and 797.92 as the third, between 797.92 and 1,077.19 as the fourth, and higher 
than 1,077.19 as the fifth quintile. 
log(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑) = ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑄𝑖 .
𝑖=5 
𝑖=1 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟 + 𝛾ℎ𝑚 + 𝜇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿𝑑 + ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑   (2) 
 
In equation (2), Qi is quintile indicator and other indicators are similar to the 
definitions in equation (1). Results for this specification are reported in column (5) of 
Table 3-3. The control variables in this regression correspond to columns (4) in the same 
table. We find that the DC effect is monotonically increasing in baseline consumption 
level-- the largest effect is observed for the group with highest baseline consumption. 
These results are consistent with the average effect for all households that are estimated 
and presented in column (4) of the same tables. 
The analysis suggests that households in the highest quintile of the baseline consumption 
reduce consumption by an estimated 18.1% in response to the DC service. However, 
there appears to be an increase in usage in daily consumption for those households in the 
lower quintiles of the baseline consumption. This response is referred to as a “boomerang 
effect”, where customers who learn that they are using less than their neighbors or other 
like-households increase their demand (Clee and Wicklund 1980). It should be noted that 
the analyses on both Opower and WaterSmart do not find evidence of a boomerang effect 
in any of the studied markets. The techniques employed here take a rather coarse 
approach to segmenting the population. Regarding gallons per day, households in quintile 
one increased their consumption by 24 gallons per day, households in quintile two, three, 
four, and five decreased consumption by 0.68, 33, 70, and 172 gallons per day.  
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Note that, the coefficient -0.078 in column (4) of summarizes average percent 
reduction across all households. This is different from the aggregate reduction in 
consumption resulting from DC because it does not take into account the fact that 
households with high levels of baseline use experienced larger percentage reductions than 
households with lower baseline use.  Therefore, the average percentage reduction capture 
by the coefficients in columns (4) is less than the weighted aggregate effect of DC. To 
measure weighted aggregate DC effect, we use average use in each quintile in the 
baseline period, a number of households in each quintile, and the estimated effect of DC 
in each quintile. Aggregate DC effect for the population of households participating in 
DC is calculated using equation (3): 
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 =
∑ ?̅?𝑖∗𝛽𝑖∗(𝑁𝐻𝐻)𝑖
5
𝑖=1
∑ ?̅?𝑖∗(𝑁𝐻𝐻)𝑖
5
𝑖=1
              (3) 
where: Aggregate Effect is aggregate DC effect for the population of households 
participating in DC, ?̅?𝑖 indicates average usage in 2013 for households who eventually 
enrolled in DC, βi indicates estimated coefficient for the quintile i from Table 3-3, 
(𝑁𝐻𝐻)𝑖 indicates the number of enrolled households in quintile i. 
Results indicate that aggregate DC effect is 9.21% for the population of 
households participating in the DC program.  Assuming all the households in the City of 
Folsom water utility service area participate in DC and have a similar response, then 
aggregate DC effect would be 9.24%. Aggregate DC effect from the second case, 
assuming everybody in the utility service area participates in DC, is slightly higher than 
aggregate DC effect from the first case. This larger effect is because the composition of 
households, in terms of baseline use, is shifted towards lower end users for the overall 
population (e.g., more households will be in the lower quintiles) 
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3.5.2.2 What are the specific mechanisms of DC effect? 
 
The discrete specification above provides no sense of the dynamics of DC adoption and 
water consumption: how quickly water consumption decreases after a household enrolled 
in DC program and whether this effect grows, decrease, or stabilizes. Following Autor 
(2003), we explore these dynamics using equation (4): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚) = ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑖=𝑚
𝑖=−𝑚 . 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖 + 𝛾ℎ𝑚 + 𝜇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿𝑑 + ℎ𝑦𝑚      (4) 
 
In equation (4), m is an indicator for a month. In the first specification, we include 
indicators for one, two, and three months before enrollment in DC, 0-3 months after 
enrollment, and from month four forward. Of these eight indicator variables, note that the 
first seven are equal to one only in the relevant month, while the final variable is equal to 
one in each month, starting with the fourth month of enrollment.  
Table 3-4 presents results for this specification.  Results indicate that DC effect is 
not significant months before DC program starts. In the first month of the program, 
households who participated in the program reduce average daily water consumption by 
2.8%, on average. This effect is between 4.6%-6.9% in the subsequent months. In the 
long run (4-months or more after enrollment in DC), households who participated in DC 
program reduce their average daily water consumption by 7.8% in response to DC.  
Next, we divided the sample into two groups and then add an indicator variable 
for months 1-5 before enrollment in DC, and months 0-12 after enrollment in DC. The 
first group includes all never enrolled households plus DC participant households who 
enrolled between 1-1-2015 and 1-7-2015. The second group includes all the never 
enrolled households plus DC participants who enrolled between 1-1-2016 and 1-7-2016. 
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Using results from these specifications, we can identify how quickly does water 
consumption decreases after a household enrolls in the DC program, do conservation-
minded people adopt first, and do early adopters respond differently.  
Figure 3-5 presents the result of this specification. The coefficients on the 
enrollment leads are not statistically different from zero, showing evidence of common 
trends assumption, which supports the use of difference-in-differences estimator. For the 
first group, in the month of enrollment, DC program reduces average daily water 
consumption by 5.44%, after which this reduction fluctuates at between 3.52% and 
11.22% over the subsequent 12 months. On average, we observe that households who 
enrolled in the program reduce average daily water consumption by 6.52% which is 
consistent with our findings in column (4) of Table 3-3. For the second group, in the 
month of enrollment, DC program reduces average daily water consumption by 0.78%, 
after which this reduction fluctuates at between 3.44% and 6.99% over the subsequent 12 
months. On average, we observe that households who enrolled in the program reduce 
average daily water consumption by 5.86%. 
Results from this figure indicate that DC have stabilized over time. Also, we did 
not find any evidence that early enrolled households are different from households who 
adopted later and the response of these two groups to DC is not substantially different. 
Finally, we these results indicate that DC effect is persistent.  
3.5.2.3 Does Dropcountr indicator measure an omitted variable such as being conservation 
minded? 
One concern with these analyses might be that DC indicator is measuring an omitted 
variable such as being conservation minded. The issue is that we cannot directly test for 
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this, but we conduct the following indirect test.  
Assume there is two states of the world, one with DC and another without DC. 
Suppose that in a world with DC a conservation-minded person sees an advertisement for 
water conservation, then looks for ways to conserve and finds DC and as a result 
conserves water. Now, suppose that in a world without DC, the same conservation-
minded person sees the same advertisement and looks for ways to conserve and, since 
there is no DC, finds conservation tips from the water utility website and conserves. 
Figure 3-6 shows these two states of the word with and without DC. 
 
Another feature of the daily data use in this study is that it indicates which type 
and time of messages sent to the customers. DC sends messages like monthly report 
email, leak alert, and new users tip. Note that messages like monthly report emails and 
leak alerts are only available through DC. However, households can have access to 
messages like new user tips without DC (e.g., through utility website, monthly bills, etc.). 
Table 3-5 indicates all messages sent by DC to the customers enrolled in DC by May-
2017. To identify the effect of each message type on water consumption, we treat each 
message type as a separate treatment. Specifically, we used the following specification to 
capture the effect of each message type on daily water consumption: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑) = ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑑
𝑑=14
𝑑=1
𝑖=3
𝑖=1 . 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑑 + 𝛾ℎ𝑚 + 𝜇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿𝑑 + ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑  (6) 
 
In equation (6), the variable of interest is Message. Message indicator only takes value 
one if household i received message i at day d or d-1, d-2, …, d-13. For example, 
Message12Takes one for households who received message type 1 and on one day after 
receiving the message. Figure 3-7 indicates the results of this specification. Starting with 
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leak alert, we observe that leak alerts increase consumption by 60% on the first day. This 
effect decreases quickly on days following the leak alert message. This result indicates 
that households are paying attention to the leak alerts and trying to stop the leak 
immediately following the alert. For example, one day after receiving a leak alert 
message, consumption decreases by 30%.  Six days after a leak alert, consumption 
decreases by 50%. Monthly report emails effect on daily water consumption is negative 
and significant but reduces over time. Households have the biggest reduction in 
consumption on the day that they receive the report (approximately 10%). In the next 13 
days, this effect fluctuates between 2%-6%.  
On the other hand, new user tips type of message is not statistically significant in any of 
the days after households receive these tips. This is at some level is evidence that DC 
indicator is not measuring an omitted variable like being conservation minded. Even if 
conservation minded type households are enrolling in DC, these results suggest that 
without DC there would not be water conservation.  
3.5.3 Does Dropcountr act through efficiency channel? 
Following Allcott and Kessler (2015), nudges (in our application, DC reports) can affect 
demand through two main channels. The first view is that nudging is informative. Based 
on this view, the water market is characterized by imperfect consumer information 
(households have imperfect information about their consumption history, others 
consumption, methods to increase efficiency, etc.). Based on this view, we assume that 
there is no moral utility and a nudge only provides information or eliminates bias. In 
Figure 3-8, D0 represents the water demand curve before the introduction of social 
comparison program (in our application, DC), while D1 represents the demand curve after 
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the introduction of such a program.  In fact, nudges improved efficiency and shifts 
demand curve from D0 to D1 and changed consumption by 𝐸 = 𝑄𝐷𝐶
∗ − 𝑄∗. 
Nudging effect on consumption through the efficiency channel has important 
implications for calculations of ratepayer welfare losses due to disruptions in the water 
supply.  We assumed the water supply disruption of R= Q*-QR, where R> E. Without 
programs like DC, welfare loss due to disruption R will be an area of ABCD. However, if 
programs like DC are in place, and it is acting through the efficiency channel, then 
welfare loss due to a similar supply disruption of R will be A’B’CD’. Note that ABCD-
A'B'CD'= ABD'D>0 and represents an upward bias in welfare loss estimations without 
considering the effect of low-cost information programs (nudging, like DC) on demand. 
The larger effect of DC on water consumption means larger shifts in the water demand 
curve and larger upward bias in estimations of welfare losses due to supply disruption of 
R.  
The second view is that nudging effects through Moral Suasion. In this view, the 
nudge itself may directly impose negative utility. For example, seeing cigarette warning 
labels with graphic images of smoking-related diseases can be unpleasant, and body 
weight report cards could make children feel guilty or shameful. In our application, 
seeing neighbors and affect households consuming less water could make a household 
feel guilty. Building on Caplin (2003) and Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2006), Glaeser 
(2005) argues that many nudges are essentially emotional taxes that reduce utility but do 
not raise revenues.  
Now we assume full efficiency in water consumption (perfect information) and 
the nudge only raises the moral price of water (in this scenario, nudge effects 
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consumption through the Moral Suasion channel.) In this case, D0 in Figure 3-9 reflects 
the demand curve with and without the nudge. However, P∗moves to PDC
∗  which reflects 
water price plus moral tax. Similar to a regular tax, moral tax reduces consumer surplus 
by AP*P*DCA' area. Note that moral tax does not generate revenues and only reduces 
consumer surplus (reduced utility). Figure 3-9 illustrates this scenario. Same as the first 
scenario, before DC, welfare loss due to a supply disruption of R would have an area of 
ABCD. Welfare loss due to supply disruption of R after a moral tax, because of programs 
like DC, reduces the area from ABCD to A'B'CD. However, in this scenario, we need to 
account for the reduction in the consumer surplus due to the moral tax.   
Taken together, welfare loss due to a supply disruption of R after a moral tax will 
result in a net welfare loss of WL(R)= A'B'CD + AP*P*DCA'. WL(R) could be greater, 
equal to, or smaller than ABCD, depending on the difference between ABB'E and 
A'EP*P*DC. However, it is more likely to be the case that ABB'E < A'EP*P*DC, which 
suggests that without considering programs like DC, we are underestimating welfare 
losses due to water supply disruptions.  
In this paper, we conduct an empirical test to evaluate the channel in which DC is 
acting.  If DC changes the weekly consumption composition, then one possibility is that 
households are reoptimizing their consumption after receiving the information through 
DC. To identify if households who enrolled in the program have different consumption 
patterns than those who did not enroll we interact day of the week indicator with 
Dropcountr indicator.  
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑞ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑) = ∑ 𝛼𝑖 . 𝐷𝑖 . 𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟
𝑖=7 
𝑖=1 + 𝛾ℎ𝑚 + 𝜇𝑚𝑦 + 𝛿𝑑 + ℎ𝑦𝑚𝑑  (7) 
In equation (7), the variable of interest is Dropcountr, which denotes whether a household 
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observation is in the enrolled group during the post period in which DC was active, 
multiplied by day indicator Di. 
Figure 3-10 indicates the results of this specification. Results indicate that DC has 
the largest effect on Mondays and lowest effect on Saturdays and Sundays. Consumption 
is at its highest level on Saturdays and Sundays and is at its lowest level on Mondays. 
Next, we interact quintile indicators with a day of the week and Dropcountr indicators. 
Coefficients on these variables indicate the effect of DC by day of the week and quintile 
of water consumption. Results are presented graphically in Figure 3-10. We observe that, 
first, DC effect is monotonically increased regardless of the day of the week. Second, we 
observe the same pattern that we observed for the average effects: DC has the largest 
effect on Mondays in all the quintiles. Interestingly, we observe boomerang effect for the 
second quintile only on Saturdays and Sundays. DC has the lowest effect during the 
weekend in a way that this effect is positive for first two quintiles, not significant in the 
third quintile, and negative in the fourth and the fifth quintile.  
Using this test, we observe that households change their consumption 
composition within a week and it is suggestive that DC works through information 
channel rather than moral suasion. It seems that households are reoptimizing their 
consumption composition in a week after receiving the information from DC. Note that 
this is only one test in one location and further research requires for answering this 
question explicitly. 
3.5.4 Information and effectiveness of non-linear pricing  
The City of Folsom water utility uses an Increasing Block Pricing (IBP) for the water 
rate. IBP thresholds are shown in Figure 3-11. To test whether enrollment in the DC 
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program improves response to the marginal price we conduct the following test. Using 
daily consumption data, we could identify households jump date from one tier to another 
within a month. However, to do so, we need to observe everyday water use within a 
month (e.g., households i in month m jumps from tier one to tier two in day 15 and from 
tier two to tier three in day 25). For this purpose, we create a subset of data that were 
complete within a month for each household. 
Following Chetty et al. (2011); Saez (2010); and Ito (2014), we used bunching 
around the non-linear pricing kink points to examine whether enrollment in DC makes 
consumers respond to the marginal price. We used bunching of the consumers at the kink 
points of nonlinear price schedules for DC enrolled households and not enrolled 
households. Such bunching must be observed if consumers respond to marginal price.  
As shown in Ito (2014) consumers respond to the average price rather than 
marginal price without information interventions such as DC. Therefore, distribution of 
consumption for not enrolled households can provide a baseline for this empirical test. 
We employed consumption data from all 12 months of 2016. Next, daily water 
consumption is aggregated for each household within a month. The top panel in Figure 3-
12 shows the consumption distribution for the control households, households who never 
enrolled in DC, and results indicate that consumption is smoothly distributed. The bottom 
panel in Figure 3-12 shows the histogram of consumption for the DC enrolled, 
households. The distribution is as smooth as the distribution in never enrolled 
households, and there is no bunching around the kink points. We also find no bunching 
for any year of the data. The absence of bunching implies one possibility. Consumers 
have no response to the marginal price and information provided by DC did not improve 
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this response. Further studies required to investigate this question in greater detail. 
3.6 Conclusion and Policy Implications  
This study provides insight into how social-norm-based conservation programs affect 
water usage. Specifically, the effect of DC on water usage was examined by using 
household-level panel data and adopting a difference-in-differences approach. Results 
suggest that the introduction of the DC services for the population of households 
participating in DC causes ATOT of 7.8% reduction in daily water usage.  
These are also evidence that not all of the households react alike to DC. The 
results hold, as a general rule, that those in the higher quintiles of baseline water usage 
had the largest responses. The analysis suggests that in response to the DC service 
households in the highest quintile of baseline consumption reduce water usage by an 
estimated 18% --at the margin, these are a large effect. This result is comparable with the 
existing literature (Allcott 2011, Brent, Cook, and Olsen 2015, Ferraro and Miranda 
2013). Such a result indicates the effectiveness of sub-group targeting in social-norm-
based conservation programs towards baseline users with higher consumption. 
Future analyses suggest that there is heterogeneity in response to the DC program. 
We have evidence that DC program acts through the information channel. The simple test 
indicates that DC program did not improve households' response to marginal price in the 
City of Folsom water utility service area. 
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3.7 Figures and Tables  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3-1 Dropcountr Home Water Use Report Sample 
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Figure 3-2 Enrollment Evolution in Dropcountr Program Over Time. A Total Number of 
3,353 Households Enrolled by the End of April 2017 Was 3,353 
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Figure 3-3 (A) Average Water Consumption (Gallons Per Day) by Enrollment Status 
During the Study Period. (B) The Difference in Average Water Consumption, As a 
Percent, Across Time by Enrollment Status 
Notes: Vertical dashed lines Indicate start of the Dropcountr program (December 2014). 
Horizontal dot lines represent the average percent difference in household consumption 
for the pre- and post-Periods. Average percent difference in household consumption for 
the pre-periods is approximately 0% and for post-periods is approximate -6%.  
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Figure 3-4 Average Consumption (Gallons Per Day) for Enrolled and Never Enrolled 
Groups by Quintile 
Notes: The Vertical Dashed Line Indicates the Start of the Program (December- 2014)  
Notes: Quintiles of consumption are defined based on the average baseline summer 
usage. Quintiles thresholds in gallons per day are 401.00 and lower as first quintile, 
between 401.00 and 646.32 as second, between 646.32 and 797.92 as third, between 
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797.92 and 1,077.19 as fourth, and higher than 1,077.19 as the fifth quintile. 
 
Figure 3-5 The Estimated Impact of Dropcountr on Water Consumption for Months 
Before, During, and after Enrollment in Dropcountr Services (Includes 95% Confidence 
Intervals) 
Notes: Estimated effects presented in percentage forms. Horizontal bold dash lines 
indicate average effect for before and after the program start date. The top portion of this 
figure uses a subsample of households and includes all never enrolled households plus 
DC participant households who enrolled between 1-1-2015 and 1-7-2015. The bottom 
portion of this figure includes all the never enrolled households plus DC participants who 
enrolled between 1-1-2016 and 1-7-2016. 
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Figure 3-6 Two States of World, Top Portion with Dropcountr and Bottom Portion 
without Dropcountr 
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Figure 3-7 The Estimated Impact of Dropcountr on Water Consumption by Message 
Types (Includes 95% Confidence Intervals) 
 
Notes: Month by year fixed effects, household by month fixed effects, and day of the 
week fixed effects used in estimation. 
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Figure 3-8 The Effect of a Nudge That Acts Through Efficiency Channel on Welfare 
Losses Calculations due to Water Supply Disruptions 
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Figure 3-9 The Effect of a Nudge that Acts Through Moral Tax Channel on Welfare 
Losses Calculations due to Water Supply Disruptions 
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Figure 3-10 The Estimated Impact of Dropcountr on Water Consumption for each Day 
of the Week (Includes 95% Confidence Intervals)  
Notes: Month by year fixed effects, household by month fixed effects, and day of the 
week fixed effects used in the estimation 
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Figure 3-11 Increasing Block Pricing Structure in the City of Folsom Water Utility 
Service Area, Effective Since January-2013. Before January-2013 the City of Folsom 
Water Utility Used a Flat Pricing Structure 
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Figure 3-12 The Figure Shows the Histogram of Household-Level Monthly Cumulative 
Water Consumption in the City of Folsom, CA Water Utility Service Area.  
Notes: The Vertical Solid Lines Show the Kink Points of the Nonlinear Price Schedule. 
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Table 3-1 Summary Statistics of Data Available for Analysis. Average Daily 
Consumption Values in Gallons for the Baseline Period 
  All accounts Never enrolled group Enrolled group 
Number of accounts 19,524 16,171 3,353 
Pre-DC observations 10,769,093 8,893,550 1,875,543 
Post-DC observations 10,874,899 8,825,345 2,049,554 
Baseline:    
Average 589.54 589.23 591.02 
25th percentile 157.09 155.60 164.57 
Baseline median 403.95 396.47 433.87 
75th percentile 748.05 748.05 748.05 
 
Notes: Baseline period is January 2013 through December 2014. Dropcountr is still 
active. 
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Table 3-2 Average Daily Water Consumption in the Enrolled and Never Enrolled Groups 
(Gallons Per Day)  
 
Never enrolled 
households 
Enrolled 
households 
Difference 
(level) 
Difference 
(%) 
Pre-period 589.23 591.02 1.79 0.3 
Post-period 476.86 446.61 -30.25 -6.34 
Double difference -112.37 -144.41 -32.04 -6.65 
 
Notes: Households that never enrolled in Dropcountr consumed on average 589.23 
gallons of water pre-period; this number reduced to 476.86 gallons in post-period. 
However, households that eventually enrolled in Dropcountr consumed 591.02 gallons of 
water pre-period and 446.61 gallons in post-period. Comparing two groups indicates that 
Dropcountr reduced water consumption in the enrolled group by 32 gallons per day. In 
percentage terms, Dropcountr reduced water consumption in the enrolled group by 
6.65%. 
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Table 3-3 Dropcountr Effect on Daily Water Consumption (Gallons/Day) in the City of 
Folsom, CA Water Utility Service Area 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dropcountr -0.11*** -0.101*** -0.081*** -0.078***  
 
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  
Post -0.312*** -0.263***    
 (0.001) (0.003) 
   
Dropcountr Enrolled Household 0.055*** 
    
 (0.001) 
    
Dropcountr Effect in Quintile 1 
    
0.118*** 
 
    (0.031) 
Dropcountr Effect in Quintile 2 
    
-0.002 
 
    (0.013) 
Dropcountr Effect in Quintile 3 
    
-0.071*** 
 
    (0.013) 
Dropcountr Effect in Quintile 4 
    
-0.111*** 
 
    (0.013) 
Dropcountr Effect in Quintile 5 
    
-0.181*** 
 
    (0.022) 
Household Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No No 
Household X Month Fixed 
Effects 
No No No Yes Yes 
Month X Year Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes 
Day of the Week Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 21,643,992 21,643,992 21,643,992 21,643,992 21,643,992 
R-square 0.019 0.398 0.495 0.534 0.534 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Log of household-level daily water consumption is the dependent variable in all of the 
specifications. Standard errors for all the specifications are reported in parentheses and 
are clustered at the level of the households.  
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Table 3-4 The Estimated Impact of Dropcountr on Water Consumption for Months 
Before, During, and after Enrollment in Dropcountr Services in the City of Folsom, CA 
Water Utility Service Area 
 (1) (2) 
 
  
Dropcountr Average Effect -0.078***  
 (0.008 
 
 
  
Three Months before Enrollment  0.008 
 
 (0.009) 
 
  
Two Months before Enrollment  0.017 
 
 (0.010) 
 
  
One Month before Enrollment  0.0002 
 
 (0.011) 
 
  
Enrollment Month  -0.028** 
 
 (0.011) 
 
  
One Month after Enrollment  -0.069*** 
 
 (0.011) 
 
  
Two Months after Enrollment  -0.051*** 
 
 (0.010) 
 
  
Three Months after Enrollment  -0.046*** 
 
 (0.010) 
 
  
Four Months or more after Enrollment  -0.078*** 
 
 (0.009) 
 
  
Household X Month Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Month X Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Day of the Week Fixed Effects Yes No 
Observations 21,643,992 911,613 
R-square 0.534 0.702 
Notes: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
Standard errors for all the specifications are reported in parentheses and are clustered at 
the level of the households.  
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Table 3-5 Summary of Messages Sent by Dropcountr to the Enrolled Customers in the 
City of Folsom, CA Water Utility Service Area from December-2014 to May-2017 
Message Type Sending Frequency 
  
Monthly report email 38,348 
Leak alert 3,157 
New user tips 628 
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Chapter 4. ISO-14001 STANDARD AND FIRMS’ ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE U.S. TRANSPORTATION 
EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS 
 
Abstract 
Manufacturers have been increasingly relying on environmental management systems 
(such as ISO 14001 based ones) to comply with government regulations and reduce waste. 
In this paper, we investigated the impact of ISO 14001 certification on manufacturers’ toxic 
release by release level. We applied the censored quantile instrumental variable estimator 
(CQIV) to data on the U.S. transportation equipment manufacturing subsector facilities. 
Results show that ISO 14001 had a negative and statistically significant effect on the top 
10% manufacturing sites regarding the on-site toxic release, but it did not reduce off-site 
toxic release. Therefore, one should not expect ISO 14001 to have a uniform impact on 
manufacturing sites’ environmental performance. For large firms, encouraging voluntary 
adoption of ISO 14001 might be an effective government strategy to reduce on-site 
pollution. However, for small firms and to reduce off-site pollution, other economic 
incentives or regulations are warranted. 
 
Keywords: Censored quantile regression, Environmental performance, ISO 14001, 
Manufacturing. 
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4.1 Introduction  
 
Many manufacturers have an environmental management system (EMS) to 
comply with government regulations and reduce waste. Most EMSs are based on 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001, a private standard that helps 
manufacturing facilities to develop organized environmental policies, goals, and plans for 
achieving their environmental objectives, and to monitor and evaluate their success. To 
obtain certification to ISO 14001, a facility needs to choose a certifier (known as 
certification body) that will conduct an audit and determine if the facility can be certified. 
Adoption of ISO 14001 is fast-expanding in the world. For the United States, the number 
of facilities with ISO 14001 certification increased from 639 in 1999 to 6,071 in 2013 
(ISO, 2013). Figure 4-1 shows the top 10 countries with ISO 14001 certificates in 2013. 
China ranked the highest with over 100,000 certificates, and the United States ranked the 
ninth. 
Adoption of ISO 14001 is growing for many different reasons. First, many 
governments encourage self-regulation and voluntary actions among industries to reach 
overall environmental goals. Governments want to do this because voluntary actions in 
comparison with government environmental policies and economic incentives (e.g., 
pollution tax, pollution quotas, and emission trading) are less costly and may be 
administratively more acceptable to the industry (Anton, Deltas, and Khanna 2004, 
Arimura, Darnall, and Katayama 2011). The U.S. government has also begun to promote 
greater adoption of EMSs that can be implemented through the ISO 14001 certification 
process (Anton, Deltas, and Khanna 2004, Rondinelli 2001). For example, if facilities 
had an active EMS in place (e.g., ISO 14001 certified) at the time of a violation of 
environmental regulations, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) would reduce 
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the penalty associated with this violation (Curkovic, Sroufe, and Melnyk 2005, Lally 
1997).  
Secondly, ISO 14001 adoption may result in other benefits for manufacturing 
facilities. These benefits include, based on the assumption that the environmental 
performance of facilities may improve after adopting ISO 14001, improvement in 
stakeholder satisfaction, fewer inspections by the EPA or other environmental regulatory 
agencies, better company image, lower public pressure, and lower insurance costs 
(Begley 1996a, b). 
Promotional efforts toward the adoption of ISO 14001 are primarily based on the 
assumption that ISO 14001 has a positive effect on facilities’ environmental performance. 
However, this assumption may not hold true from either theoretical or empirical 
standpoint (as shown in later sections). For this reason, many researchers have begun to 
empirically examine the effect of ISO 14001 adoption on facilities' environmental 
performance. Research findings of this effect are largely inconclusive. On the one hand, 
some researchers found adopting ISO 14001 had a strong positive impact on 
environmental performance (e.g. (Comoglio and Botta 2012, Franchetti 2011, Nguyen 
and Hens 2013, Testa et al. 2014)). On the other hand, some studies only found weakly 
statistically significant evidence of the effect of ISO 14001 on environmental 
performance (e.g. (Barla 2007, Dahlström et al. 2003, Ziegler and Rennings 2004)), and 
some others found no relationship between ISO 14001 adoption and environmental 
performance at all (e.g. (Darnall and Sides 2008, Gomez and Rodriguez 2011, King, 
Lenox, and Terlaak 2005, Zobel 2015)). 
A commonality between all of the previous studies is that they did not 
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differentiate between the levels of pollution across facilities. In reality, the effect of ISO 
14001 adoption may be dependent on the actual levels of pollution a facility is currently 
at, which becomes the focus of this study. For example, there is a possibility that facilities 
with a high pollution level get certified because they want to lower public pressure and 
get fewer inspections from the EPA. For these types of facilities, the effect of ISO 14001 
on pollution level can be weak or even positive due to selection issue. Similarly, the 
effect for facilities with low pollution level can also be weak because they may have 
reached the minimum level of pollution and having ISO 14001 does not induce them to 
further reduce pollution. Therefore, we hypothesize that the effect of ISO 14001 adoption 
is different for facilities with various levels of pollution and this study provides the first 
attempt to provide empirical evidence on this issue.  
4.2 Background Literature   
 
4.2.1 ISO-14001 standard overview  
The first version of the ISO 14000 series, ISO 14001, was released in 1996 and 
then revised in 2004. ISO 14001 provides a framework for facilities to follow so they can 
set up an effective EMS. The ISO 14001 standard can assure company management, 
employees, and external shareholders that environmental impact is being monitored and 
improved (ISO, 2002).  
To be certified by ISO 14001, facilities are required to have third-party 
verification (the use of a third-party certification body) to ensure that they follow the 
standard. In the first step, the facilities agree to reduce environmental impacts over time. 
After the facilities agree to reduce their environmental impacts, they should prove that 
their EMS meets the five key component of ISO 14001 requirements (Arimura, Darnall, 
and Katayama 2011, Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama 2008). The five essential 
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components are: (1) environmental policy––a facility needs to draft an environmental 
policy statement, determine objectives of the facility in terms of environmental impact, 
and make this policy publically available, (2) planning––an agenda outlining the facility’s 
plan to meet the goals, (3) implementation and operation––a facility will establish 
necessary components  to implement the program such as structure and operation, 
training, and documentation, (4) checking and corrective action––a facility needs to 
perform periodic monitoring to assure that the facility’s EMS meets its targets and 
objectives and, if not, what corrective actions should take place, and (5) management 
review––management staff should do periodical review, mostly once a year, to assure the 
EMS continues to be effective and sustainable. ISO 14001 certified facilities should 
follow Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle over time to maintain its registration with the ISO 
(Arimura, Hibiki, and Katayama 2008, Welford 1998, Whitelaw 2004).  
4.2.2 ISO 14001 and environmental performance  
 
Considering the rapid, worldwide growth of ISO 14001 adoption, research about 
the effect of this certification on the environmental performance of facilities is also 
growing. As mentioned above, ISO 14001 is a non-governmental voluntary standard 
through which facilities can successfully implement their EMS. The certification process 
itself does not force facilities to improve their environmental performance as long as the 
facilities have satisfied the requirements for certification (Corbett and Kirsch 1999). 
Overall, various studies found that ISO 14001 can improve or have no impact on 
environmental performance, depending on the facility’s location, the sector/industry, and 
the measure of environmental performance. When we discuss “improvement of 
environmental performance” or “a positive effect of certification” in this study, we mean 
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a reduction of waste release/generation/emission as a result of certification. Table 4-1 
provides a summary of the studies in this area, grouped by the impact of ISO 14001.  
Many studies report that ISO 14001 improved environmental performance. 
Montabon et al. (2000) found evidence that ISO 14001 improved both overall 
environmental performance and economic efficiency of facilities. Russo and Harrison 
(2001) considered the electronics sector in the U.S. and had concluded that the 
certification could have a positive (and statistically significant) effect on toxic release 
reduction.  Another study for the same sector by Russo (2009) indicates that ISO 14001 
has a positive impact on facilities emission. Also, this study showed that the earlier they 
adopt it, the higher the positive impacts are. These results were also supported by the 
Babakri et al. (2004) whose results indicated that recycling performance in the U.S. is 
significantly positively affected by ISO 14001 certification. Also, they found that smaller 
facilities and early adopters of the certification had greater improvement in recycling 
performance than bigger facilities as well as late adopters. Melnyk, Sroufe, and 
Calantone (2003) used North American data and found that facilities with ISO 14001 
standard reduced their waste disposal. Potoski and Prakash (2005) provided evidence that 
ISO 14001 certified facilities in the U.S. reduced their toxic emissions faster than non-
certified facilities.  More recently, Franchetti (2011) used the U.S. manufacturing firm-
level data and found that ISO 14001 certification reduced solid waste. 
Some studies also provide evidence on the positive relationship between 
environmental performance and ISO 14001 standard in countries other than the United 
States. Ziegler and Rennings (2004) found that ISO 14001 has a weak (statistically 
significant at the 10% significance level) positive effect on environmental performance at 
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German manufacturing facilities. Using Japanese facility-level data, Arimura, Hibiki, and 
Katayama (2008) found that ISO 14001 helped to reduce environmental impact. Nguyen 
and Hens (2013) used Vietnam cement industry data and found a positive relationship 
between ISO 14001 certification and environmental performance in this industry. Testa et 
al. (2014) examined the effect of ISO 14001 certification effect on carbonic anhydride 
emissions in energy-intensive facilities of Italy. Their result indicated a positive 
relationship between ISO 14001 certification and environmental performance.  
On the other hand, several studies found that ISO 14001 certification had no 
statistically significant effect on the environmental performance, such as Andrews et al. 
(2003); Dahlström et al. (2003), and King, Lenox, and Terlaak (2005). Barla (2007) 
studied the ISO-14001 certification effect on the environmental performance of the paper 
and pulp industry in Canada. This study indicated that facilities with ISO 14001 
certification did not improve their environmental performance compared with non-
certified facilities. Darnall and Sides (2008), using meta-analysis method, did not find 
any significant relationship between ISO-14001 certification and environmental 
performance improvement in the U.S. facilities. Gomez and Rodriguez (2011) tested the 
effect of ISO 14001 on the toxic release of industrial facilities in northern Spain and 
found that ISO 14001 certification did not have an impact on pollution. A similar finding 
was reported by Zobel (2015) using Swedish manufacturing firm-level data.  
Overall, the literature largely shows an inconclusive relationship between ISO 
14001 standard and environmental performance. Nawrocka and Parker (2009) used 23 
different studies in a meta-analysis framework to display the relationship between 
environmental performance and the ISO 14001 standard. They conclude that this 
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relationship is mixed and case specific.  
Our study differs from the studies above in that we examine the effect of ISO 
14001 on the environmental performance of facilities at different levels of pollution. This 
has not been previously addressed in the literature. In the theoretical model section, we 
show theoretically why the relationship between ISO 14001 certification and 
environmental performance might depend on the levels of pollution. We subsequently 
provide an empirical test of the hypothesis using detailed facility-level data in the U.S. 
transportation equipment manufacturing subsector. In this paper, we will consider toxic 
release as a representative case of environmental performance.   
4.3 Theoretical Model 
 
4.3.1 From a cost-minimization perspective 
In this section, we first illustrate the impact of ISO 14001 from a simple cost 
reduction standpoint (which is more applicable to perfect competition market structure) 
and then analyze the impact from a full profit-maximization perspective (which is more 
applicable to imperfect competition). Based on Mishan (1974) and Dasgupta, Hettige, 
and Wheeler (2000), optimal emission level by facilities can be determined by the 
following argument. For each facility, cost-minimizing emission intensity (i = 
pollution/output) is determined by the intersection of expected marginal penalty (EMP) 
and the facilities’ marginal abatement cost (MAC). EMP is the price of the pollution and 
increases with the pollution intensity level. On the other hand, MAC is downward sloping 
and indicates that marginal abatement cost is higher for lower levels of emission (see 
Figure 4-2).  MAC can be a function of different variables. For specific levels of 
pollution intensity, larger facilities will generally have lower MAC than smaller 
firms(Dasgupta, Hettige, and Wheeler 2000).  
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Denote tc as the total cost of pollution to the facility that is the sum of (c) 
pollution abatement cost, and (f), the penalty for different pollution levels. We assume 
that pollution abatement cost is a function of pollution intensity. Also, there is a penalty 
associated with each level of pollution intensity. Hence, f is a function of pollution 
intensity as well. Equation 1 shows the cost function that facilities are minimizing: 
(1) 𝑡𝑐(𝑖) = 𝑐(𝑖) + 𝑓(𝑖). 
Taking first order conditions with respect to i yields equation (2), by which we can 
determine the optimal level of the pollution intensity:  
(2) 
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑖
+
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑖
= 0 or 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑖
= −
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑖
. 
Note that in equation (2),  −
𝜕𝑐
𝜕𝑖
= 𝑀𝐴𝐶 and    
  𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑖
= 𝐸𝑀𝑃. MAC can be defined as the 
cost to reduce an extra unit of pollution intensity. EMP can be defined as the penalty for 
an extra unit of pollution intensity, which is the price of pollution. Figure 4-2 shows this 
basic framework. From the interaction of MAC1 and EMP1 the optimal level of the 
facility pollution intensity can be determined, which in this case is i*.      
Having different MAC and EMP functions, each facility has it is own unique 
pollution intensity level. A downward shift in MAC can occur when facilities change 
their production process or EMS to reduce pollution intensity (e.g. adopting ISO 14001). 
In fact, pollution-intensive facilities will face higher marginal cost because regulatory 
scrutiny intensifies at a higher level of pollution intensity (e.g. marginal production cost 
increases as a result of more frequent inspections by the regulator) and these facilities 
also face higher pressure from consumers, shareholders, and the local community. As 
shown in figure 4-2, as a result of ISO 14001 adoption, we expect that MAC1 shifts 
downward to MAC2 and holding EMP constant at EMP1, optimal pollution level 
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decreases from i* to i1. On the other hand, certification may act as a signaling tool and 
reduce the pressure from consumers, shareholders, and community on the facility. As a 
result of this, we can expect a downward shift in EMP (from EMP1 to EMP2). Holding 
MAC constant at MAC1, this shift leads to an increase in the pollution level by the 
facility from i* to i2. Optimal pollution intensity could, therefore, increase, decrease or 
remain unchanged following ISO 14001 certification. Therefore, the impact of ISO 
14001 depends on the cost effect (MAC), the benefits effect (reduced EMP), and likely 
the original optimal pollution intensity. If the cost effect dominates, then we would 
expect pollution intensity to decrease due to certification. If the benefit effect dominates, 
pollution intensity should increase due to certification. 
4.3.2 From a profit-maximization perspective 
In this paper, we propose a new framework to analyze the impact of certification 
on pollution intensity, in which facilities maximize profit instead of minimizing cost. The 
main advantage of this framework is it provides insight into why certification’s effect on 
pollution intensity might depend on the production technology that generates pollution 
(we show this using a monopoly market structure) and firm size (we illustrate this point 
in an asymmetric Cournot model).  
Consider a profit-maximizing monopolist whose profit depends on price (p), the 
quantity of production (q), and production cost (c).21 We specify the production cost as 
𝑐[𝑞, 𝑙(𝑞), 𝑡)], where l is the total pollution level (l = i*q) and t denotes certification (we 
assume a continuous degree of certification to facilitate comparative statics analysis). The 
inclusion of pollution level in the cost function reflects the abatement cost of pollution, 
                                                     
21 We did not specify the aforementioned penalty for different pollution levels (f) to make results more 
generalizable. In addition, such cost is more closely tied to the pollution intensity rather than the production 
level, and will drop out of the first-order condition. 
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which should increase with production level. The profit function for a monopolistic firm 
is  
(3) 𝜋 = 𝑝(𝑞, 𝑡)𝑞 − 𝑐[𝑞, 𝑙(𝑞), 𝑡)] , 
Where we assume certification may enhance demand for the firm’s products if buyers 
(especially institutional ones) care about this attribute. The first order condition with 
respect to q is:  
(4) 
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑞
= 𝑝 + 𝑞𝑝𝑞 − 𝑐𝑞 − 𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑞 , 
where 𝑝𝑞 denotes the partial derivative of p with respect to q, and so on. Totally 
differentiating equation (4) leads to the following: 
(5) 𝑝𝑞𝑑𝑞 + 𝑝𝑡𝑑𝑡 + 𝑝𝑞𝑑𝑞 + 𝑞(𝑝𝑞𝑞𝑑𝑞 + 𝑝𝑞𝑡𝑑𝑡) − (𝑐𝑞𝑞𝑑𝑞 + 𝑐𝑞𝑙𝑑𝑙 + 𝑐𝑞𝑡𝑑𝑡) −
(𝑐𝑞𝑙𝑑𝑞 + 𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑙 + 𝑐𝑙𝑡𝑑𝑡) 𝑙𝑞 − 𝑙𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑙𝑑𝑞 = 0.                       
To focus on the impact of certification, we assume the following second-order derivatives 
are zero without losing much generalizability: 𝑝𝑞𝑡 (certification does not change the slope 
of the demand curve), 𝑐𝑞𝑞, 𝑐𝑞𝑙, and 𝑐𝑙𝑙 (constant marginal cost with respect to production 
and pollution). After simplifying and some rearrangement, equation (5) becomes 
(6) 
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑝𝑡−𝑐𝑞𝑡−𝑐𝑙𝑡𝑙𝑞
−2𝑝𝑞−𝑞𝑝𝑞𝑞+𝑙𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑙
       
Note that by definition, the pollution intensity is expressed as 𝑖 =
𝑙
𝑞
. To see how 
certification may affect pollution intensity, we can totally differentiating i with respect to 
t and obtain: 
(7) 
𝑑𝑖
𝑑𝑡
=
(𝑙𝑞−𝑖)
𝑞
𝑑𝑞
𝑑𝑡
=
(𝑙𝑞−𝑖)(𝑝𝑡−𝑐𝑞𝑡−𝑐𝑙𝑡𝑙𝑞)
𝑞(−2𝑝𝑞−𝑞𝑝𝑞𝑞+𝑙𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑙)
. 
Equation (7) warrants some additional analysis. Note that −𝑞𝑝𝑞𝑞/𝑝𝑞 is the elasticity of 
the slope of the inverse demand curve (a measure of the convexity of the demand curve), 
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which is generally assumed to be less than two in the literature (Dixit 1986, Zheng, Bar, 
and Kaiser 2010). Therefore, given the assumption of a downward sloping demand curve 
𝑝𝑞, the −2𝑝𝑞 − 𝑞𝑝𝑞𝑞 term in (7) is positive (this is most clear when demand is linear and 
𝑝𝑞𝑞 = 0). In addition, we expect that pollution increases with production (𝑙𝑞 > 0) and 
pollution increases cost (𝑐𝑙 > 0); certification enhances demand (𝑝𝑡 ≥ 0), reduces 
marginal cost of producthe tion (𝑐𝑞𝑡 ≤ 0), and/or reduces marginal cost of pollutionthe  
(𝑐𝑙𝑡 ≤ 0). The last three effects capture the intended impacts of certification. Therefore, 
the (𝑝𝑡 − 𝑐𝑞𝑡 − 𝑐𝑙𝑡𝑙𝑞) term in (7) is positive. Assume 𝑙(𝑞) = 𝛼1𝑞 + 𝛼2𝑞
2,  so that 
(𝑙𝑞−𝑖)
𝑞
 
becomes 𝛼2. Therefore, we will have three scenarios for the impact of certification on 
pollution intensity, depending on the production technology that determines the sign of 
𝑙𝑞𝑞. 
 Scenario 1: 𝑙𝑞𝑞 = 0, pollution increases with production linearly. Under this 
scenario, certification increases production but does not affect pollution intensity. 
Scenario 2: 𝑙𝑞𝑞 > 0, that is, pollution increases with production at an increasing 
rate. Under this scenario, the sign of (7) is positive. That is, certification will increase 
both production and pollution intensity. 
 Scenario 3: 𝑙𝑞𝑞 < 0, that is, pollution increases with production at a decreasing 
rate. Under this scenario, the sign of (7) is indeterminate. If 𝑙𝑞𝑞 is sufficiently negative, 
then certification will decrease production but increase pollution intensity; otherwise, 
certification will increase production but decrease pollution intensity. 
Overall, the above analysis shows that the impact of certification on production 
and pollution intensity depends crucially on the production technology that generates 
pollution. For some facilities, especially smaller ones without much investment in new 
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technology, certification may increase pollution intensity. Large facilities may generate 
pollution at a decreasing rate along with production. For them, certification should reduce 
pollution intensity. It is this theoretical ambiguity that necessitates an empirical 
investigation of the impact of certification on environmental performance. 
 We now show how the size of a facility might affect the impact of certification on 
production building on the work by Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser (2010). The impact of 
certification on facility j’s production in an asymmetric Cournot market assuming 
constant marginal cost and 𝑙𝑞𝑞 = 0 can be expressed as (Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser (2010), 
equation 5) 
(8) 
𝑑𝑞𝑗
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑝𝑡(𝑠𝑗𝑁𝐸−𝐸+1)
−𝑝𝑄(1+𝑁−𝐸)
       
where Q is market demand, N is the number of facilities supplying products in the 
market, 𝑠𝑗 is the market share of the output of the j-th facility, and 𝐸 = −𝑄𝑝𝑄𝑄/𝑝𝑄 is a 
measure of demand curve convexity. Zheng, Bar, and Kaiser (2010) show that the 
denominator of (8) is positive. Therefore, the impact of certification on production 
depends on the facility’s market share and demand convexity. For example, for convex 
demand curve that features E > 1, then only sufficiently large facilities’ production will 
increase with certification. For concave demand (E < 0), only sufficiently small facilities’ 
production will increase with certification, highlighting how facility size may affect the 
impact of certification. 
4.4 Data  
This study uses facility-level cross-sectional data for the year of 2013 because 
certification data over the years are not available. We focus on the facilities in the U.S. 
transportation equipment manufacturing subsector, which is under code 336 based on the 
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North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). By definition, industries in this 
subsector produce equipment for the transportation of people and goods (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2015). We chose to use this subsector because it is one of the largest industrial 
sectors in the United States and ISO 14001 adoption is popular in this subsector. In 2014, 
this subsector had 1.6 million employees (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015). Also, a 
random sample of all facilities in the U.S. industrial sector shows that this subsector is the 
most popular for adopting ISO 14001 with 20 percent adoption rate in 2013. Regarding 
pollution level, this subsector had the second highest amount of toxic release in 2013, 
after the metal manufacturing subsector (NAICS 331). This high degree of pollution is 
another reason we chose this subsector for further investigation (Toxics Release 
Inventory, 2013 and author calculations).  
We use data from three different sources. The first part includes environmental 
variables such as toxic release that is obtained from The EPA Toxics Release Inventory 
(TRI) database. TRI contains annual facility-level data on toxic release. Based on 
Emergency Planning and Community-Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA) law, all 
manufacturing facilities in the U.S. are required to report to the EPA the amount of toxic 
they release into the air, land, and water for more 320 toxic chemicals. Using the TRI 
database, there were 1,261 facilities in the U.S. transportation equipment manufacturing 
subsector that reported their amount of toxic release. The second part of the data is the 
information about facility characteristics such as sales volume and the number of 
employees. We obtained this data from the ReferenceUSA Company, which provides 
data on U.S. businesses. Because ReferenceUSA did not have information on all facilities 
on our list, our usable sample size reduced to 678. Finally, information about the number 
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and type of certification for these facilities was obtained from the Independent 
Association of Accredited Registrars Directory (IAAR).   
4.5 Empirical Model   
 
4.5.1 A measure of environmental performance 
Given that total pollution/emission is assumed linearly related to 
pollution/emission intensity, the dependent variable in this paper is environmental 
performance measured by the total toxic release by sample facilities in 2013. For 
robustness purpose, we use both on-site toxic releases and off-site transfers as dependent 
variables. Using disaggregated emission data, we could identify the effect of ISO 14001 
adoption on a particular type of disposal method. 
EPA has regulations on off-site toxic chemicals transfer under the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Based on the RCRA, only facilities that meet 
technology-based standards for construction and operation can have an off-site toxic 
release. There can also be extra costs, such as the cost of shipping, related to off-site toxic 
treatment. Also, there are technical standards for waste treatment at the end-of-the-pipe 
(Andrews 2006, Anton, Deltas, and Khanna 2004). As a result, compared to off-site 
releases, on-site releases may be cheaper and more convenient for facilities to pursue thus 
can create more social pressure from the neighboring communities and shareholders 
(Anton, Deltas, and Khanna 2004). 
4.5.2 Control variables  
We provide detailed information on all variables used in this study in Table 4-2. 
The first and most important group of variables are the types of certifications that 
facilities held in 2013. In this group of variables, we have environmental certification 
such as ISO 14001 and other types of certification such as ISO 9001 (general quality 
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management system). In our models, ISO 14001 is a binary variable that takes the value 
of one if the facility has ISO-14001 certification in 2013 and takes the value of zero 
otherwise. Number and type of certification for these facilities was obtained from the 
IAAR. Variable ISO 9001 is defined and obtained similarly.   
Facility characteristics such as sales volume, production growth ratio, facility 
credit score, facility type, community population of the facility location, and facility size 
represent the first group of independent variables. These variables are measured at 2013 
and were provided by RefrenceUSA dataset except the production growth ratio. Most of 
these variables are self-explanatory except a few: the production growth ratio, provided 
by the TRI dataset, indicates the rate of production growth by each facility over the 
previous year. A facility credit score is a number from 0 to 100; a higher number 
indicates a better credit score. Four different groups of facilities are created based on 
facilities type. Facilities can be headquarters, branch, subsidiary, and single location. 
Finally, we have the industry type fixed effects. The NAICS divided the U.S. 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing Subsector into seven smaller subsector groups. 
These subsectors are: Motor Vehicle Manufacturing (NAICS 3361), Motor Vehicle Body 
and Trailer Manufacturing (NAICS 3362), Motor Vehicle Parts Manufacturing (NAICS 
3363), Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing (NAICS 3364), Railroad Rolling 
Stock Manufacturing (NAICS 3365), Ship and Boat Building (NAICS 3366), and other 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing (NAICS 3369). To differentiate between 
different subsector groups, we have dummy variables for each industry. 
The third group of independent variables in this paper is pollution related. We use 
a binary variable to indicate if a facility is releasing chemicals under the Clean Air Act 
107 
 
(CAA) regulation. The idea is that if the chemicals released are under the CAA 
regulation; then there may be more pressure from the public on the facility which may 
subsequently lead to a lower level of pollution level. In addition to chemicals, we use a 
dummy variable to indicate whether a facility is releasing metals that are regulated by the 
EPA.  
4.5.3 Summary statistics  
Table 4-3 shows summary statistics for the sample facilities used in this paper. 
The first panel shows toxic release by the facility. On average facilities in 2013 release 
around 6,000 pounds, with two-thirds of release coming from on-site release. The second 
panel shows facility characteristics. Sales for these facilities in 2013 vary from 83 dollars 
to 22 million dollars, providing ample degree of variation for our estimation.  
Table 4-4 shows the summary statistics for different types of certification held by 
facilities. About 15 percent of the facilities in our sample have at least one type of 
certification, and about 6 percent of the facilities have ISO 14001 certification. The most 
popular certification is ISO 9001 (held by 10 percent of facilities).  
4.5.4 Statistical method and econometric specification  
Our basic estimating equation is: 
(9)      ln(𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑆𝑂14001𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖  
 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑖 is the environmental performance in facility i which in this paper is defined 
as totaa l toxic release in facility i,   𝐼𝑆𝑂14001𝑖  is a dummy variable previously defined, 
and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of control variables such as log of sales volume,a  log of population, aa 
nd etc. which is explained in the Table 4-2, 𝜇𝑖 is an industry fixed effects, and 𝑖 captures 
all unobservable factors affecting the dependent variable.  
108 
 
We chose the econometric models to fit our objectives and nature of data. Our 
goal is to test the effect of ISO 14001 on environmental performance and check if this 
effect is different for high pollution-generating facilities compared with low pollution-
generating facilities. Quantile regression is the appropriate model in this case.  
A potential problem with our dataset is sample selection bias. Based on TRI 
dataset, facilities that manufacture or process more than 25,000 pounds of TRI-listed 
chemicals or use more than 10,000 pounds of a listed chemical in a given year must 
report to TRI (USEPA 2013). In other words, the probability of not reporting to TRI is 
related to the level of toxic release, and this can cause sample selection bias. Facilities 
that do not report their toxic release level cannot affect our estimation (Russo 2009). To 
address this issue, we use the censored quantile regression (CQR) (Powell 1986).  
Endogeneity is also another potential problem in our study. Specifically, in our 
study, this can be a potential problem because of measurement error (Frisch 1934) and 
sample selection (Heckman 1979). It is possible that facilities choose to have ISO 14001 
because they have high pollution level, and certification helps them lower the pressure 
from consumers as well as inspection regulators. The estimation will be biased if these 
endogeneity issues are not addressed. Anton, Deltas, and Khanna (2004) used an 
instrumental variable to deal with this issue. A quantile regression estimator that 
considers both our potential problems was introduced by Chernozhukov, Fernández-Val, 
and Kowalski (2015), known as the censored quantile instrumental variable (CQIV) 
estimator. Combining quantile regression with censoring and endogeneity, we use the 
CQIV estimator. Our preferred estimating equation becomes: 
(10)      ln(𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑆𝑂14001𝑖̃ + 𝛽𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜉𝑖  
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where 𝐼𝑆𝑂14001𝑖̃  is 𝐼𝑆𝑂14001𝑖  instrumented with ISO9001 in the first-stage regression 
equation: 
(11)      𝐼𝑆𝑂14001 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑆𝑂9001𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜐𝑖 
4.6 Results 
Tables 4-5 and 4-6 present the empirical results. We report the coefficient for ISO 
14001 here and report the estimated coefficients for the other controls in Appendix Table 
A1. OLS and quantile regression results are reported in table 4-5 and both suggest that 
ISO14001 certification does not have a statistically significant effect on total toxic 
release.  
We then applied the quantile regression with consideration of endogeneity and 
censoring in our models and results are presented in Table 4-6. In the case of 
endogeneity, variables that are correlated with ISO 14001 adoption but not with the 
pollution level (i.e., the error term) are needed. To address this issue, we used ISO 9001 
as instrumental variables (IV) for ISO 14001. ISO 9001 is a quality management system 
standard. To become certified, an organization needs to demonstrate its ability to 
consistently provide product that meets customer and applicable statutory and regulatory 
requirements, and aims to enhance customer satisfaction through the effective application 
of the system, including processes for continual improvement and the assurance of 
conformity to customer and applicable statutory and regulatory requirements (ISO, 2015).  
ISO 9001 certification is a good candidate for an instrument for several reasons. 
First, certification decisions to ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 are correlated. Christmann and 
Taylor (2001) investigated the relationship between ISO 14001 and ISO 9001, and their 
result indicates a positive relationship between these two certifications. The positive 
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relationship is mostly because ISO 9001 certified facilities could have lower learning cost 
in the adoption of ISO 14001. These two certifications share the management system-
based approach including document and record control, internal audits, corrective 
actions, preventive actions, continual improvement, and management reviews 
(Christmann and Taylor 2001, Potoski and Prakash 2004). Second, facilities with ISO 
9001 certification would be familiar with the general structure of an ISO management 
standard, the necessary paperwork involved in certification. These facilities may already 
have established relationships with local ISO auditors. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
expect that a facility may start with ISO 9001 certification. As they become more familiar 
with ISO standards, they may proceed to adopt ISO 14001 environmental standard. We 
also tested for the weak instrument hypothesis in the first-stage regression. The t-value 
for the ISO 9001 coefficient (which is positive) is 3.2, implying this is not a weak 
instrument. 
Despite these similarities, there is a major difference between ISO 9001 and ISO 
14001. While ISO 9001 focuses on facilities’ product and management quality aspects, 
ISO 14001 focuses on facilities’ environmental aspects and impacts. With ISO 9001 
certification, facilities need to fulfill requirements and ensure customer satisfaction, while 
continuously improving the effectiveness of its operations. ISO 9001 is to control product 
quality and does not require companies to account for the impact of their activities on 
their surroundings. However, ISO 14001 is for environmental management and facilities 
need to minimize its effect on the environment. One requirement of both of these 
standards is that facilities document their processes (assuming that facilities control the 
quality of their products under the ISO 9001 certification and the environmental impact 
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of their activities under the ISO 14001 certification) if they have those processes are 
written down (Bénézech et al. 2001, Larsen and Häversjö 2001). Overall, ISO 9001 
adoption should not affect pollution much due to the standard’s scopes and emphases.  
Panel A in Table 4-6 shows CQIV estimation results. The effect of ISO 14001 
now is not statistically significant for the first, second, or third quartile of data. However, 
such effect is negative and statistically significant (at the 5% significance level) for the 
90th percentile (that is, the top 10% of facilities regarding total toxic release). The 95% 
confidence intervals of estimated parameters were obtained via non-parametric bootstrap. 
We used Wald test statistics to test for differences in the coefficients across quantiles. 
Wald test results show that the null hypothesis (that they are identical) can be rejected at 
the 1% significance level.   
For robustness check, we differentiated pollution levels as on-site and off-site and 
conducted a similar analysis, respectively. These can be seen in Panel B and C in Table 
4-6. The results indicate that the effect of ISO 14001 on on-site pollution level is similar 
to the effect of ISO 14001 on total toxic release level. However, we found that ISO 14001 
had no statistically significant effect on off-site pollution level.  
4.7 Summary and Conclusion 
Manufacturers have been increasingly relying on EMSs to comply with 
government regulations and reduce waste. In this paper, we investigated the impact of 
EMSs on facilities’ toxic release. More specifically, we tested the hypotheses that the 
effect of ISO 14001 certification is related to facilities’ pollution levels. We used three 
different sources to collect data on facility characteristics, toxic release by facilities, and 
finally, certification types that facilities hold.  
We applied the censored quantile instrumental variable estimator (CQIV) to data 
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on the U.S. transportation equipment manufacturing subsector facilities. CQIV estimator 
results indicate that ISO 14001 had a negative and statistically significant effect on the 
top 10% facilities in terms of on-site toxic release and total toxic release (on-site and off-
site combined). We did not find any impact of ISO 14001 on off-site toxic release. In 
other words, ISO 14001 is effective for decreasing on-site pollution by facilities and is 
not effective in decreasing off-site pollution. 
These findings may have important policy implications. We should not expect 
ISO 14001 to have a uniform impact on manufacturing sites’ environmental performance, 
as indicated by our theoretical section and empirical evidence. We found that the impact 
of ISO 14001 depends on whether the toxic release is on site or off site, and on whether 
the toxic release is large enough. Therefore, for large facilities, encouraging voluntary 
adoption ISO 14001 might be an effective government strategy to reduce on-site 
pollution. However, for small facilities and to reduce off-site pollution, other economic 
incentives or regulations are warranted.  
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4.8 Figures and Tables  
 
Figure 4-1 Top 10 Countries for ISO 14001 Certificates in 2013    
       
Source: The ISO Survey of Certifications 2013.  
Notes: In the United States firms with ISO 14001 increased from 639 in 1999 to 6,071 in 
2013.  
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Figure 4-2 Optimal Pollution Intensity Determination 
 
 
Notes: Pollution intensity level could increase or decrease after certification adoption depending 
on the movements of  MAC and EMP. 
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Figure 4-3 Log of Total Toxic Release in Different Quantiles 
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Table 4-1 Summary of the Literature on How ISO 14001 Affects Environmental 
Performance   
Authors (year) Country Sector/Industry 
A measure of Environmental 
Performance 
Impact of ISO 14001 on 
Environmental Performance 
Montabon et al. (2000) U.S. 
Manufacturing (SIC 
20-39) 
not specified Improves 
Russo and Harrison 
(2001) 
U.S. Electronic sector toxic release improves 
Russo (2009) U.S. Electronic sector toxic release improves 
Babakri et al. (2004) U.S. Not specified recycling improves 
Melnyk et al. (2003) U.S. 
manufacturing (SIC 
20-39) 
waste disposal improves 
Potoski and Prakash 
(2005) 
U.S. 
Manufacturing (SIC 
20-39) 
Toxic release improves 
Franchetti (2011) U.S. 
Manufacturing (SIC 
20-39) 
Solid waste generation improves 
Arimura et al. (2008) Japan manufacturing 
Use of natural resources, Solid 
waste generation, and Wastewater 
effluent 
improves 
Comoglio and Botta 
(2012) 
Italy Automotive sector 
Use of resources, waste 
management, release to water, etc 
improves 
Nguyen and Hens 
(2013) 
Vietnam cement industry dust, SO2, and NO2 improves 
Testa and et al. (2014) Italy 
energy intensive 
facilities 
carbonic anhydride emissions improves 
Ziegler and Rennings 
(2004) 
German 
manufacturing 
(NACE-Codes 15-
37) 
not specified weakly positive 
Dahlström et al. (2003) 
 
U.K. Not specified 
compliance with environmental 
regulations 
did not improve 
Barla (2007) 
 
Canada 
paper and pulp 
industry 
discharges of BOD or TSS did not improve 
King et al. (2005) 
 
U.S. 
Manufacturing 
(NACE-Codes 15-
37) 
The deviation between observed 
and predicted waste generation 
no relationship 
Darnall and Sides (2008) U.S. Not specified not specified no relationship 
Gomez and Rodriguez 
(2011) 
Spain manufacturing toxic release no relationship 
Zobel (2015) 
 
Sweden manufacturing waste generation no relationship 
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Table 4-2 Description of Variables 
Variable Definition Variable used Data source 
Total Toxic 
Release 
A "release" of a chemical means 
that it is emitted to the air or 
water, or placed in some type of 
land disposal (See the EPA 
website for more information). 
Log of total toxic release TRI  
ISO 14001 
Environmental management 
certification published by ISO 
Dummy (1 if facility 
holds ISO 14001 
certification, 0 
otherwise) 
IAAR 
ISO 9001 
Quality management system 
standard certification published 
by ISO 
Dummy (1 if facility 
holds ISO 9001 
certification, 0 
otherwise) 
IAAR 
Sales Value ($) Sales value of the facility  
Log of sale for each 
facility 
RefrenceUSA 
Production 
Growth Ratio  
An indicator of facility 
production volume changes with 
respect to the previous year. 
Production ratio is calculated by 
dividing production volume in 
year t to production volume in 
year t-1. 
Continuous variable TRI dataset 
Facility Credit 
Score 
Credit rating code of the facility 
(0-100). A higher number 
indicates better credit score. 
Continoues variable RefrenceUSA 
Facility Type 
Indicates facility type including 
headquarter, branch, subsidiary, 
and single location.  
Dummy variable RefrenceUSA 
Community 
Population 
The resident population of the 
city in which the facility is 
located. Some assignments can 
be unclear, such as when cities 
cross county lines. To maintain 
this granularity, the actual 
assignment is done at a zip 
level. 
Continoues variable                      
(log of population size) 
RefrenceUSA 
Size of the 
Facility 
Indicates the square footage of 
the location that a facility 
operates at. 
Continoues variable                     
(log of facility size) 
RefrenceUSA 
CAA Chemical   
If a facility is releasing chemical 
under the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
regulation.  
Dummy variable TRI dataset 
Metal Category 
If a facility is releasing metal 
defined by the EPA. (See the 
EPA website for categories and 
takes) 
Dummy variable TRI dataset 
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 Table 4-3 Summary Statistics, 2013  
Variable 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean Min Max S.D 
Panel A: Toxic release by facilities (unit: pound) 
Total Release 678 6,355 0 139,733 16,984 
On-Site Release 678 4,679 0 139,733 15,222 
Off-Site Release 678 1,674 0 93,867 7,968 
Panel B: Firm characteristics  
Sales ($) 678 290,288 83 22,372,184 1,187,161 
Production Ratio  678 0.98 0 7.69 0.56 
Facility Credit Score 678 96 70 100 5 
Community 
Population  
678 
88,225 12,500     1,000,000 198,928 
Size of the Facility 678 34,980     1,250       40,000 10,058        
CAA Chemical  678 0.77     0 1 0.421           
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Table 4-4 Summary of the Certification Types Held by Facilities in 2013 
Certification Type 
Number of 
Facilities 
Percentage of Total Sample 
(Percent) 
At Least One Type of 
Certification 
102 15.05 
ISO 14001- 2004 37 5.46 
ISO 9001-2008 64 9.44 
AS9100C-2009 19 2.80 
ISO/TS 16949  30 4.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120 
 
 
Table 4-5 OLS Regression Result and Quantile Regression Result at Different Quantiles 
Panel A: Dependent variable: log of total toxic release (pounds) 
 
 Quantile Regression 
OLS 
Regression 
25% 50% 75% 90% 
ISO 14001 
-0.92 
(0.56) 
-1.52 
(1.02) 
-1.43 
(0.98) 
-1.02  
(0.64) 
-0.904  
(1.05) 
Panel B: Dependent variable: log of total on-site toxic release (pounds) 
ISO 14001  
-1.05* 
(0.58) 
-1.35 
(0.91) 
-2.02 
(1.58) 
-0.88 
(0.68) 
0.39  
(0.69) 
Panel C: Dependent variable: log of total off-site toxic release (pounds) 
ISO 14001  
-1.25 
(0.80) 
-0.83 
(0.94) 
-1.76 
(1.23) 
-1.09 
(1.01) 
-0.18  
(1.14) 
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Table 4-6 OLS Regression Result and Instrumental Variable Censored Quantile 
Regression Result at Different Quantiles 
Panel A: Dependent variable: log of total toxic release (pounds) 
 
 CQIV Regression 
OLS 
Regression 
25% 50% 75% 90% 
ISO 14001 
 
-0.92 
(0.56) 
-3.31 
(-9.06) 
[1.52] 
-1.14 
(-11.36) 
[2.08] 
-1.10  
(-6.63) 
[1.16] 
-0.31**  
(-5.02) 
[-0.25] 
Panel B: Dependent variable: log of total on-site toxic release (pounds) 
ISO 14001  
 
-1.05* 
(0.58) 
-1.78 
(-11.02) 
[1.64] 
-1.25 
(-9.50) 
[1.52] 
-0.56  
(-8.35) 
[1.23] 
-0.36**  
(-4.52) 
[-0.15] 
Panel C: Dependent variable: log of total off-site toxic release (pounds) 
ISO 14001  
 
-1.25 
(0.80) 
-5.18 
(-11.87) 
[9.74] 
-1.41 
(-3.85) 
[10.41] 
-1.75  
(-2.11) 
[8.06] 
-1.47  
(-1.06) 
[11.25] 
N=678 
Notes: Lower bounds of bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals from bootstrap 
replications are in parentheses and upper bounds are in brackets. ** indicates the 95% 
confidence interval does not include zero. Industry dummies are not displayed but can be 
seen in the appendix.  
t-value from first stage=6.24 
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4.9  Appendix A  
 
Table 4-7 Instrumental Variable Censored Quantile Regression Result at Different 
Quantiles 
 Quantiles 
 25 50 75 90 
Log of Sales -0.192 0116 0.111 0.084 
 (-0.218) (-0.161) (-0.214) (-0.220) 
 [0.558] [0.455] [0.358] [0.378] 
Production Growth Ratio 0.674 0.433 0.224 0.129 
 (-0.310) (-0.176) (-0.030) (-0.321) 
 [1.254] [0.671] [0.420] [1.476] 
Facility Credit Score 0.137 0.033 0.033 0.050 
 (-0.035) (-0.011) (-0.007) (-0.028) 
 [0.230] [0.187] [0.159] [0.118] 
Facility Type (Branch) 3.090 -1.717 -0.494 -0.172 
 (-3.864) (-1.761) (-1.668) (-2.173) 
 [4.215] [4.908] [6.941] [1.330] 
Facility Type (Single Location) 3.964 -1.035 -0.352 0.187 
 (-3.267) (-1.711) (-1.151) (-2.361) 
 [5.346] [6.475] [7.044] [1.791] 
Log of Population -0.232 -0.183 -0.008 -0.078 
 (-0.348) (-0.556) (-0.454) (-0.370) 
 [0.250] [-0.014] [0.215] [0.186] 
Log of Facility Size -0.638 -0.642 -0.579 -0.480 
 (-2.234) (-2.016) (-1.992) (-1.650) 
 [-0.453] [-0.211] [-0.321] [-0.365] 
CAAC Chemical 0.190 0.633 0.126 -1.518 
 (-0.418) (-0.701) (-0.736) (-1.011) 
 [1.756] [1.173] [1.618] [1.264] 
Metal Category 1 -2.470 -1.890 -0.656 1.146 
 (-3.992) (-3.147) (-2.439) (-2.005) 
 [0.116] [2.387] [6.317] [3.746] 
Metal Category 2 -6.486 -6.242 -4.327 -1.268 
 (-8.377) (-6.209) (-5.692) (-4.941) 
 [-3.911] [-1.453] [3.010] [1.238] 
Constant 2.490 7.484 11.966 10.690 
 (-3.993) (-4.399) 0.265 2.192 
 [14.475] [15.668] [21.854] [28.285] 
Notes: Dependent variable: log of total toxic release (pounds). Lower bounds of bias-corrected 95% 
confidence intervals from bootstrap replications are in parentheses and upper bounds are in brackets 
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Chapter 5. CONCLUSION 
5.1 Summary 
 
This dissertation sought to investigate non-price based environmental policies with a 
primary focus on water conservation policies and pollution control policy. In the first 
essay, we evaluate a command- and- control type policy; the second essay considers 
voluntary adoption of a water conservation technology, and the third essay evaluates the 
effectiveness of voluntary adoption of a pollution control certification. Results of each 
essay are discussed below, along with broader implications, and their connection to each 
other. 
 California’s 2015 urban water mandate is an example of a regulatory, 
environmental policy that adopted most recently. To mitigate the adverse impacts of 
drought, in April 2015 Governor Jerry Brown issued an executive order mandating a 
statewide reduction in water use by 25% in urban areas, which generally targeted 
residential water-use. The aggregate cost of the governor’s mandate regarding lost 
consumer welfare is an estimated $875 million. The cost to implement the water 
conservation mandate is $106 million in the San Francisco Bay area and $769 million in 
Southern California. In other words, Northern California households have a WTP of $24 
per month to avoid the conservation mandate. Households in Southern California have a 
WTP of $26 per month to avoid this mandate. 
Results of this essay indicate that California’s water mandate, as an example of 
regulatory, environmental policy, is associated with welfare losses which may not be so 
tangible to some policymakers. Also, estimating these losses would be beneficial for 
evaluating alternative policy options such as market-based policies. Another important 
result of the first essay is the evidence that welfare losses are substantially different 
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across different utilities, depending on several factors such as elasticity of water demand. 
The results also indicate that on average, consumers in Northern California over-
complied with the conservation mandate, while those in Southern California slightly 
under-complied.  
Results of the first essay provide evidence on the two main concerns with command-
and-control type policies including welfare losses and compliance. However, voluntary 
approaches, as another type of non-price method, compared with regulatory approaches 
might be more cost-effective. The central issue with voluntary approaches is that it is 
difficult to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of these policies. In the second and the 
third essay, we focus on evaluating the effectiveness of two popular voluntary programs: 
a water conservation technology and a pollution control certification. We use these two 
programs as examples of voluntary approaches as an environmental policy.  
These two programs provide insights from different angles in two important ways. 
First, the first program is in the water sector and applied by city water managers but the 
second program is in the industrial manufactures level and applied by firms. Second, the 
first program is at the consumer level and the second one is at the producer level.  
For the second essay, we estimate how web-based Home Water Use Reports 
(HWURs) affect household-level water consumption in Folsom City, California. The 
HWURs under study, offered by the company Dropcountr (DC), share social 
comparisons, consumption analytics, and conservation information to residential 
accounts, primarily through digital communications. In mid-December of 2014, all 
account holders in the City of Folsom water utility service area were offered the option of 
participating in the DC pilot program on a “first come, first served” basis. The data 
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utilized in this essay is a daily panel tracking single-family residential households from 
January-2013 to May-2017. We found that there is a 7.8% reduction in average daily 
household water consumption for a typical household under treatment of the DC 
program. Results suggest that the effect of DC varies by the baseline consumption 
quintile, the number of months in the program, the day of the week, quartile of the year, 
message type, and enrollment wave. We also conduct empirical tests to evaluate the 
channels through which DC may act to reduce consumption.  
The main results of this essay indicate that with technology advances, information 
provision is a low-cost way to reduce residential water consumption which could be used 
in other sectors as an environmental policy as well. Using price to achieve similar 
conservation would require a 34% increase in price which is politically difficult to 
impose such an increase in prices. Finally, we have evidence that enrollment effects are 
heterogeneous; largest impacts likely on households with outdoor water use. 
In the last essay, we examine another type of voluntary environmental policy that is 
adopted by the producers rather than consumers.  Manufacturers have been increasingly 
relying on environmental management systems (such as ISO 14001 based ones) to 
comply with government regulations and reduce waste. In this essay, we investigated the 
impact of ISO 14001 certification on manufacturers’ toxic release by release level. 
Results show that ISO 14001 had a negative and statistically significant effect on the top 
10% manufacturing sites regarding the on-site toxic release, but it did not reduce off-site 
toxic release. Therefore, one should not expect ISO 14001 to have a uniform impact on 
manufacturing sites’ environmental performance. For large firms, encouraging voluntary 
adoption of ISO 14001 might be an effective government strategy to reduce on-site 
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pollution. However, for small firms and to reduce off-site pollution, other economic 
incentives or regulations are warranted. 
Comparing results across three essays indicate that welfare consequences of 
regulatory policies or effectiveness of voluntary policies are heterogeneous across 
different subgroups. Considering this heterogeneity is important for future policy designs 
as well as targeting groups with the lowest cost or highest effectiveness. Also, voluntary 
policies are effective at least for some of the subgroups. In terms of consumers, results 
from the second essay indicate that water users with highest baseline usage are the most 
responsive to the technology adoption. In terms of producers, results of the third essay 
indicate that only firms with the highest level of pollution are those that reduce pollution 
after the adoption of ISO 14001 certification.  
5.2 Implications and Recommendations 
 
Timely water management policies are essential for allocating scare water resources 
among different users and especially providing enhanced water access for the urban 
users. Water management is far more challenging with climate change disturbing water 
cycles, which changes where and how much participation falls. Most of the western states 
are facing longer and frequent droughts. This pattern is not limited only to the western 
states in the U.S., but many other countries are facing water shortage crisis. For example, 
South Africa’s drought-stricken Cape Town has estimated 2019 for “Day Zero,” when 
taps in the city run dry and people start queuing for water.  In this dissertation, we shed 
light on non-market-based approaches as environmental policy tools, including 
distributional effects of water mandates and effectiveness of voluntarily approaches. 
Results of these essays expand our knowledge of water policies and the ways we can use 
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different strategies to achieve conservation goals.  
Results of this dissertation indicate three main policy implications. First, the 
command-and-control approach is associated with welfare losses that are not tangible to 
some policymakers. Estimated welfare losses in this dissertation could be used in the 
benefit-cost analysis of projects that provide enhanced water access for the urban users. 
Also, it is essential to consider these estimates in evaluating the cost of environmental 
policies, such as requirements for water flow in a stream. Besides, we learned that 
utilities have different compliance levels with the mandate. As a future work, it would be 
beneficial for policymakers to understand why some water agencies over/under comply 
with the mandate requirements.  
Second, through this dissertation, we learned that providing frequent and more 
information for the water customers is a low-cost way to achieve conservation goals. 
Interestingly, we observe that high-end water users are conserving the most. High water 
users are usually those with bigger lot sizes and larger yards, which typically have higher 
incomes. These are the type of households that are not very responsive to pricing policies. 
Providing information also has the potential to increase the effectiveness of pricing 
policies.  
Finally, we observed heterogeneity in welfare losses, compliance levels with the 
mandate requirements, and effectiveness of information on reducing water consumption. 
One lesson for policymakers and water agencies is that they should account for these 
sources of heterogeneity in their policy/program designs. Targeting specific households 
could be a cost-effective way to achieve conservation goals.  
As a final note, altogether these essays provide some evidence on the effectiveness of 
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non-market-based approaches as an environmental policy. However, we suggest that 
cost-effectively achieving water conservation goals cannot be met only through one 
specific policy, but rather a mix between price and non-price approaches. The partnership 
between researchers and agencies could be beneficial to find an optimal combination of 
the policies at the local level. For the agencies, it would be valuable to understand their 
customers' preferences and effectiveness of different programs for the different type of 
users. Using this knowledge, agencies could target specific users, achieve higher 
customer satisfaction rates and meet their conservation goals. Partnership with academic 
researchers could provide this knowledge for the agencies. However, without insight, 
direction, and input from agencies, the research community may miss its mark.  
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